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I. INTRODUCTION
One distinctive feature of constitutions developed in the twentieth century is
their almost uniform inclusion of socioeconomic rights provisions-rights to basic
human needs such as food, water, shelter, health care, and education.' Despite the
* © 2009 Brian Ray, Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of
Law. I would like to thank Lolita Buckner Inniss, Joan Flynn, Richard Goldstone, and
participants in the South Africa Reading Group for their helpful comments and suggestions
on earlier versions of this work. Angela Barstow and the staff of the Cleveland-Marshall
Library, especially Jessica Mathewson, provided invaluable research assistance. The
Cleveland-Marshall Fund provided generous research support. It was a pleasure working
with the staff of the Utah Law Review in the editing and publication process.
' MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL
WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 220 (2008) ("Constitutions
drafted after World War II almost universally included social welfare provisions.").
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relative ubiquity of these rights, however, judicial enforcement of them remains
relatively controversial in theory and problematic in practice.2
While concerns over judicial review arguably are heightened in the
socioeconomic rights context, the arguments over enforcement of these rights
largely mirror the debate over judicial enforcement of constitutional rights more
generally. In particular, both debates focus on the undemocratic nature of judicial
review and, consequently, are concerned with defining (and confining) the judicial
role in ways that maximize its legitimacy.
3
Defenses of judicial review are connected to those of adjudication more
generally. They often locate their legitimacy in a set of procedural
characteristics-such as judicial independence, structured participation, and
reasoned decisions-that promote objective results and serve the public interest.
Lon Fuller in his famous essay The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication defines "the
distinguishing characteristic of adjudication" as "the fact that it confers on the
affected party a peculiar form of participation in the decision, that of presenting
proofs and reasoned arguments for a decision in his favor."4 In a related vein,
Owen Fiss argues that judicial review is rooted in a "conception of the judicial
function [that] sees the judge as trying to give meaning to our constitutional
values" and a "process through which that meaning is revealed or elaborated."5
The more flexible, person-centered processes associated with alternative
dispute resolution, or "ADR," are often contrasted with adjudication. Both critics
and proponents of alternative dispute resolution often assume that, unlike
adjudication, these processes are inherently limited to solving particular disputes
and thus are unable to establish precedents applicable beyond a single dispute.
6
2 See, e.g., id. at 231-37 (2008) (describing the conventional argument against
judicial enforcement of socioeconomic rights); Frank I. Michelman, The Constitution,
Social Rights, and Liberal Justification, 1 INT'L J. CONST. LAW 13, 13 (2003) (discussing
theoretical objections to the constitutionalization of social and economic rights).
3 See Michelman, supra note 2, at 16 ("[I]t is clear that the debate [over
socioeconomic rights] throughout has been centered on a concern about the place and work
of the judiciary in the democratic political order. We seem to think the problem with
constitutionalizing social rights comes down mainly, if not solely, to a matter of the
separation of powers.").
4 Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353, 368
(1978) [hereinafter Fuller, Forms and Limits].
5Owen Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1, 12-13 (1979)
[hereinafter Fiss, Foreword].
6 See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or
Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REv. 668, 676-77 (1986) ("However, if ADR is extended to
resolve difficult issues of constitutional or public law-making use of nonlegal values to
resolve important social issues or allowing those the law seeks to regulate to delimit public
rights and duties-there is real reason for concern."); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93
YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) [hereinafter Fiss, Against Settlement] (The role of
adjudication "is not to maximize the ends of private parties, nor simply to secure the peace,
but to explicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the
Constitution and statutes: to interpret those values and to bring reality in accord with them.
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This severely limits the capacity of ADR to generate public values and perform the
norm-creation function usually associated with adjudication generally and
constitutional adjudication in particular.
This Article challenges the general perception that ADR processes cannot
develop public law norms. It follows a recent trend in ADR literature that seeks to
define a public norm creation role for ADR in part by connecting these processes
to other alternative legal and political problem-solving methods.7 This Article
focuses on a recent South African Constitutional Court case, Occupiers of 51
Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg,8 in which the court interpreted the right to
housing in the South African Constitution. 9 The court held that municipalities must
develop processes for negotiating--or, in the court's language "engaging"-with
citizens affected by redevelopment plans, to analyze how claims about the norm-
creation potential of ADR processes could be developed in the context of
constitutional adjudication of socioeconomic rights.
The heightened legitimacy and separation of powers concerns associated with
socioeconomic rights' ° mean that they have been a rich source for examining the
use of alternative enforcement approaches. The South African Constitutional Court
This duty is not discharged when parties settle."). See generally Susan Sturm & Howard
Gadlin, Conflict Resolution and Systemic Change, 2007 J. DisP. RESOL. 1, 2-3 (2007)
(discussing arguments that "ADR does not and cannot generate values or solutions that can
apply beyond the scope of the particular dispute" and "that informal conflict resolution is
necessarily non-normative, and that it cannot yield general public values or solutions to
problems affecting more than the individual disputants").
7 See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Deliberative Democracy and Conflict
Resolution, 12 No. 2 Disp. RESOL. MAG. 18, 19 (2006) (arguing that there are strong
connections between deliberative democracy theory and the ADR movement including a
shared appreciation for "constitutional experimentalism .. . in which there are feedback
mechanisms for sharing and coordinating local outcomes with the broader polity"); see also
Amy J. Cohen, Negotiation, Meet New Governance: Interests, Skills, and Selves, 33 LAW
& SOC. INQUIRY 503, 527-29 (2008) (examining connections between negotiation literature
and new governance literature); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer's Role(s) in
Deliberative Democracy, 5 NEV. L.J. 347, 348 (2004) (exploring "the use of alternative
legal, political and social problem solving institutions that draw on conflict resolution
theory and practice"); Sturm & Gadlin, supra note 6, at 3 (arguing that ADR processes are
capable of generating public law norms "when relevant institutional actors develop values
or remedies through an accountable process of principled or participatory decision making,
and then adapt those values and remedies to broader groups or situations").
8 2008 (5) BCLR 475 (CC) (S. Afr.).
9 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 26.
10 See, e.g., Dennis M. Davis, Socioeconomic Rights: Do They Deliver the Goods?, 6
INT'L J. CONST. L. 687, 688-89 (2008) (discussing objections to the inclusion of
socioeconomic rights in the South African Constitution); see generally In re Certification
of the Constitution of S. Afr. 1996 (4) SALR 744 (CC) at 793 (S. Aft.) (rejecting the
argument that socioeconomic rights included in the new constitution are inconsistent with
the separation of powers established by the constitution because they "would result in the
courts dictating to the government how the budget should be allocated").
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is one of the most active courts in this area; other jurisdictions and academic
literature cite its decisions as models for developing alternative approaches."
Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg1 2 portends a potentially
important development in its approach to enforcement. The court adopted the term
"engagement" to describe a unique remedy it developed-in essence, a permanent
negotiation/mediation requirement in housing fights cases that may involve
eviction. 13 Properly implemented, the engagement remedy can be developed into a
hybrid dispute resolution model. This model integrates ADR processes with formal
adjudication in a manner that enhances the legitimacy of the resolution and makes
possible extra-judicial interpretation and enforcement of socioeconomic rights.
This hybrid process is particularly well-suited to enforcing socioeconomic rights
because it is more democratic than formal adjudication and also more flexible and
responsive to the practical concerns that socioeconomic rights raise.
Part II of this Article outlines two classic but competing accounts of the
procedural justifications for adjudication and related assessments of the limitations
of ADR processes by Fuller and Fiss. 14 Despite their differences, the characteristics
11 See, e.g., MARK KENDE, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN Two WORLDS: SOUTH
AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES 244 (2009) ("The South African Constitution's
socioeconomic rights provisions have been celebrated internationally."); CASS SUNSTEIN,
DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS Do 236 (2001) (arguing that the
Constitutional Court's enforcement approach "suggests... for the first time, the possibility
of providing . . . protection [for socioeconomic rights] in a way that is respectful of
democratic prerogatives and the simple fact of limited budgets"); TUSHNET, supra note 1,
at xii (summarizing chapters 7 and 8 of the text, which draw "on South Africa's developing
jurisprudence of social welfare rights [to] show that the 'capacity' objection to judicial
enforcement of social and economic rights rests on the assumption that such enforcement
must take a strong form"); Michelman, supra note 2, at 15 & n.8 (2003) (citing Minster of
Health v. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (1) BCLR 1022 (CC) (S. Afr.), as "supporting
evidence" that judges "can find both properly adjudicative standards for testing claims of
social-rights violations and worthwhile, properly judicial remedies for violations when
found"); Jeanne M. Woods, Justiciable Social Rights as a Critique of the Liberal
Paradigm, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 763, 766-67 (2003) ("The South African experience in the
constitutional adjudication of social rights has profound implications. for the international
community at large"); Katharine G. Young, The Minimum Core of Economic and Social
Rights: A Concept in Search of Content, 33 YALE J. INT'L LAW, 113, 158 (2008) ("South
African constitutional law, a vanguard in many areas of constitutional rights, has inspired
much commentary on the way that the minimum core concept might resolve the
justiciability challenges of economic and social rights.").
12 2008 (5) BCLR 475 (CC) (S. Aft.).
13 See id. at para. 5.
14 See generally Fiss, Foreword, supra note 5; Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 6;
Fuller, Forms and Limits, supra note 4; Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and
Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REv, 305 (1971) [hereinafter Fuller, Mediation]. One commentator
notes, "Fuller has become the paradigm of dispute resolution, just as Fiss is the paradigm
of public law litigation." Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller's Theory of Adjudication and the
False Dichotomy Between Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation, 75
B.U. L. REV. 1273, 1279-80 (1995). Bone cites a range of sources to support this
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Fuller and Fiss identify as legitimizing adjudication share important similarities
that Susan Sturm has argued ADR processes can promote and protect.15 Part III
analyzes two related articles by Sturm and Gadlin that develop this argument.
Sturm first identifies four key characteristics that Fuller's and Fiss's accounts share
and argues that these characteristics can be advanced through mediation in the
remedial phase of public law litigation.1 6 Sturm and Gadlin, in a more recent
article, propose an ADR model that promotes those same values and therefore can
be used to develop public norms outside of adjudication.'
7
Part IV summarizes the debate over socioeconomic rights generally and the
specific debate over the South African Constitutional Court's enforcement
approach and identifies important ways in which the arguments there track the
debate over the relative roles and the legitimacy of adjudication and ADR. It then
describes the Constitutional Court's decision in City of Johannesburg and argues
that the court's engagement remedy can be developed into a hybrid process
incorporating aspects of adjudication and mediation/negotiation. It argues that this
can be done in a way that retains the flexibility and responsiveness Fuller prizes in
ADR, while still protecting the legitimacy norms both Fuller and Fiss associate
with adjudication.
II. THE DEBATE OVER ADJUDICATION AND ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Beginning in the mid-1970s, the idea of "conflict resolution" or "dispute
resolution" outside of formal adjudication gained increased attention among courts,
lawyers, and the general public.1 8 Proponents of ADR claim that its methods
address many systemic problems in litigation and offer several benefits not
available through traditional litigation. First, ADR could relieve congested court
dockets while also offering expedited resolution to parties.' 9 Second, ADR
techniques could give parties to disputes more control over the resolution
characterization. Id. at 1279 n.19 (citing William N. Eskridge, Jr., Metaprocedure, 98
YALE L.J. 945, 955-56, 962-64 (1989) (book review); Richard L. Marcus, Public Law
Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM. 647, 684-85, 687 (1988);
Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105
HARV. L. REV. 427, 431 n.8 (1991)).
15 See Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J.
1355, 1359-60 (1991).
16 Id.
7 See Sturm & Gadlin, supra note 6.
18 See SARAH R. COLE ET AL., MEDIATION LAW § 5.2 (2d ed. 2007); MICHAEL
FREEMAN, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION xi (1995).
19 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Introduction: What Will We Do When Adjudication Ends?
A Brief Intellectual History of ADR, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1613, 1616 (1997) (noting "the
duality of purposes associated with ADR--efficiency and docket-clearing potential, as well
as a claim for a better quality of justice with designated processes providing more tailor-
made solutions to legal problems").
2009]
UTAH LAW REVIEW
process.2 ° The flexibility of ADR also creates opportunities for creative remedies
that could more appropriately address underlying concerns in a dispute than could
traditional remedies.2' By offering the opportunity for consensus-based resolution,
ADR also is arguably better suited than litigation to preserving long-term
relationships and solving community-based disputes.22
One prominent metaphor that captures the distinction between ADR and
traditional adjudication is the "shadow of the law" notion developed by Robert
Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser in the context of divorce.23 Under this view, the
law acts "not as imposing order from above, but rather as a providing a framework
within which [parties] can themselves determine their . . . rights and
responsibilities. 24
A. Fuller's Forms, Functions, and Limits
Lon Fuller's essay, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions,25 was one of the
first attempts to theorize ADR processes.26 For Fuller "the central quality of
mediation" is "its capacity to reorient the parties towards each other, not by
imposing rules on them, but by helping them to achieve a new and shared
perception of their relationship. 27 In dispute resolution processes like mediation,
the goal, then, is not to get parties to accept formal rules to govern their
20 See, e.g., id.; Lisa B. Bingham, Self-Determination in Dispute System Design and
Employment Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 873, 879 (2002) ("Proponents of alternative
... dispute resolution often argue its chief value is disputant control over the process.").
21 See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical
and Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2689-90
(1995) ("[P]arties (with the expert advice of lawyers) can decide how much 'public
discourse' or confidentiality they need to resolve their dispute, how much direct
confrontation or conversation they want with the other side, and how much flexibility they
want to work out possible solutions that a court would not be authorized to award.").
22 See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Movement Is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 165, 171
(2003) ("The adoption of mediation by community justice centers may have reflected a
belief that mediation-often characterized by its supporters as antithetical to adversarial
dispute resolution processes-was more likely to nurture positive relationships within the
community.").
23 Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser argued that "[i]ndividuals in a wide
variety of contexts bargain in the shadow of the law." Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950,
997(1979).
24 Id. at 950.
25 Fuller, Mediation, supra note 14.
26 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and Fathers of Invention: The Intellectual
Founders of ADR, 16 OHIO ST. J. Disp. RESOL. 1, 13 (2000) ("In many ways, Lon Fuller
remains the only legal philosopher to take theorizing about dispute resolution processes
seriously.").
27 Fuller, Mediation, supra note 14, at 325.
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relationship, but to help them "to free themselves from the encumbrance of rules"
and to accept "a relationship of mutual respect, trust, and understanding that will
enable them to meet shared contingencies without the aid of formal prescriptions
laid down in advance. 28
Fuller contrasts the mediative function with what he calls "the standard
procedures of law," central to which "is the concept of rules., 29 Drawing a sharp
distinction between "acts" and "persons," Fuller defines rules as "requiring,
prohibiting or attaching specific consequences to acts" and places them in the
realm of adjudication. 30 By contrast, mediation is concerned principally with
persons and relationships, and it deals with "precepts eliciting dispositions of the
person, including a willingness to respond to somewhat shifting and indefinite
'role expectations. '"31
In Fuller's conception, mediation has no role to play in the interpretation and
enforcement of laws; that is the role of courts and the function of adjudication:
"[O]nce a law has been duly enacted its interpretation and enforcement is for the
courts; courts have been instituted, not to mediate disputes, but to decide them.9
32
Thus, Fuller establishes a sharp dichotomy between the "rule of law" and
ADR processes. Central to this dichotomy is his notion that rules "attribut[e] legal
or social consequences to overt and specifically defined acts."3 3 Rules (and laws)
are established in advance and must be sufficiently precise both in terms of
defining the conduct to which they apply and the consequences they will entail. By
contrast, dispute resolution processes, in their focus on people and relationships,
do not require "impersonal, act-prescribing rules" and therefore are particularly
well-suited for dealing with the kinds of "shifting contingencies" inherent in
ongoing and complex relationships.
34
Fuller further suggests that modern society creates an increasing number of
people-dependent problems suitable for "mediative" approaches. 35 He lists public
welfare systems and public hospitals as prime examples in which the responsibility
for distributing public goods "certainly needs to be at least 'mediative' (that is, as
open-mindedly consultative)" as other mediated disputes.36
Fuller's essay The Forms and Limits of Adjudication analyzes the contrasting
process of adjudication.37 For Fuller, a particular mode of participation defines
adjudication: "the distinguishing characteristic of adjudication lies in the fact that it
confers on the affected party a peculiar form of participation in the decision, that of
28 Id. at 325-26.
29 Id. at 327-28.
30 Id. at 329.
31 id.
32 Id. at 328.
33 Id. at 329 (emphasis added).
14 Id. at 330-31.
31 Id. at 336-37.
36 Id.
37 Fuller, Forms and Limits, supra note 4.
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presenting proofs and reasoned arguments for a decision in his favor. 3 The
legitimacy of adjudication is dependent on the degree to which it maximizes this
form of participation because adjudication is "a device which gives formal and
institutional expression to the influence of reasoned argument in human affairs."
39
This rationality principle not only provides the justification for adjudication's
authority, but also limits the kinds of disputes appropriate for adjudication:
"Wherever successful human association depends upon spontaneous and informal
collaboration, shifting its forms with the task at hand, there adjudication is out of
place except as it may declare certain ground rules applicable to a wide variety of
activities., 40 Fuller describes these kinds of disputes as "polycentric," meaning that
they involve complex and intersecting sets of relationships.4' Adjudication "cannot
encompass and take into account the complex repercussions" that result from
resolution of a polycentric dispute.42 More importantly, in such disputes "it is
simply impossible to afford each affected party a meaningful participation through
proofs and arguments. 43
Socioeconomic rights present a paradigmatic example of polycentricity.
44
Although he does not use the term "polycentric," Frank Michelman's description
of the "raging indeterminacy" of socioeconomic rights captures their intense
polycentric nature.45 Using a hypothetical right to "effective social citizenship" as
an example, Michelman points out that determining whether such a right has been
violated requires ascertaining the net effect of a range of government policies with
uncertain and potentially conflicting effects.46
Thus for Fuller, polycentric disputes, such as those socioeconomic rights
create, pose a real dilemma. The interrelated nature of the disputes' issues is more
susceptible to the give-and-take of ADR processes like mediation than to the
38 Id. at 368.
39 Id. at 366.
40 Id. at 371.
41 Id. at 395.
42 Id. at 394.
43 Id. at 394-95.
44 See, e.g., Bel Porto Sch. Governing Body v Premier of W. Cape Province 2002 (9)
BCLR 891 (CC) at para. 51 (S. Afr.) (discussing the "polycentric" argument by
respondents and citing Fuller, Adjudication, supra note 4); Kate O'Regan, Introduction to
Socio-Economic Rights, 1 ESR REv. No. 4 (1999), available at http://www.chr.up.ac.za/
centre-projects/socio/esrvollno4.html#2 ("Two main arguments are raised in relation to the
institutional competence of courts to enforce socio-economic rights. The first is Lon
Fuller's argument that certain types of decisions are 'polycentric' and therefore unsuitable
for adjudication."); Craig Scott & Patrick Macklem, Constitutional Ropes of Sand or
Justiciable Guarantees? Social Rights in a New South African Constitution, 141 U. PA. L.
REv. 1, 24 (1992) ("The resistance to constitutionally entrenched social rights on the
grounds of institutional competence is often summarized in the view that social rights are
said to be ... vague in terms of the obligations they mandate; and involving complex,
polycentric, and diffuse interests in collective goods.").
45 See Michelman, supra note 2, at 30-31.
46 Id.
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application of rules characteristic of adjudication. But modern society increasingly
requires resolution of public disputes that are polycentric, and Fuller's sharp
distinction between the rule of law and ADR means that relegating such disputes to
the realm of ADR comes at the cost of diminishing, if not eliminating, the ability
of the resolution to establish any broader norm applicable across disputes.
Fuller never offers a solution to this apparent dilemma.47 Nor does he identify
any process that is ideal for resolving polycentric disputes.48 But a close reading of
Mediation and Adjudication together suggests that Fuller was, in fact, open to
using hybrid forms of dispute resolution to deal with polycentric disputes.
In Adjudication, Fuller acknowledges that adjudication's ability to deal with
polycentricity depends primarily on the degree to which decisions have
precedential force: "If judicial precedents are liberally interpreted and are subject
to reformulation and clarification as problems not originally foreseen arise, the
judicial process as a whole is enabled to absorb these covert polycentric
elements., 49 Thus, more flexible forms of adjudication (in other words,
adjudication that looks more like mediation) have greater capacity to deal with
polycentricity.
Here, recall Fuller's account of mediation and its characteristic ability to deal
with shifting contingencies.50 Although he does not directly cite mediation as a
mechanism for addressing polycentricity, the complex issues he describes as
suitable for "mediative" approaches in his Mediation essay are plainly
polycentric. l And Fuller's description of the interrelated issues typically present in
mediation echoes his polycentric examples. 52
B. Fiss and the Public Function Critique
The emphasis on participant control over ADR processes, which is central to
their claimed benefits, also forms the basis of one of the principal criticisms of
ADR processes, i.e., that private resolution eliminates the public norm creation
function of adjudication. Owen Fiss, in one of the earliest and most influential
criticisms of the ADR movement, argues that adjudication is not merely a tool for
resolving private disputes, but it is also "an institutional arrangement for using
state power to bring a recalcitrant reality closer to our chosen ideals. '53 In other
words, adjudication serves important public purposes that extend beyond the
boundaries of a particular dispute and the interests of the parties to that dispute.
Fiss's critique of ADR processes is rooted in his view that adjudication is a
primarily public function that derives its legitimacy from a particular process. For
47 See generally Fuller, Forms and Limits, supra note 4.
48 Id.
- 49 Id. at 398.
'o Fuller, Mediation, supra note 14, at 325-26.
51 Id. at 336 (describing distribution of "scarce public welfare funds" and "the
problem of the crowded public hospital" as problems suitable for meditative approaches).
52 Id. at 317-18.
53 Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 6, at 1089.
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Fiss, a court's power to resolve cases is based on a "conception of the judicial
function [that] sees the judge as trying to give meaning to our constitutional
values" and a view that "adjudication is the process through which that meaning is
revealed or elaborated.,
54
Fiss develops his theory of adjudication in the context of a defense of court
resolution of complex, institutional reform litigation, or what he calls "structural
reform" litigation.55 As Fiss describes it,
[s]tructural reform ... is one type of adjudication, distinguished by the
constitutional character of the public values, and even more importantly
by the fact that it involves an encounter between the judiciary and the
state bureaucracies. The judge tries to give meaning to our constitutional
values in the operation of these organizations.56
These cases also implicate the same complex, interrelated issues that Fuller
identifies as characteristic of polycentric disputes.57
Fiss argues that two aspects of courts and the adjudicative process legitimize
their resolution of public disputes: "one is the judge's obligation to participate in a
dialogue, and the second is his independence. ' '58 By "dialogue," Fiss means the
adversary process: judges do not pick their cases; they must listen to all parties,
issue decisions, and articulate reasons for those decisions.59 Independence requires
that the judge not identify with any of the parties; the judge's decision must be
impartial.6°
Fiss rejects the argument that courts lack the institutional competence to deal
with complex public disputes as both empirically unsupported and inconsistent
with this understanding of the judicial role. 6' He argues that there is no convincing
evidence that administrative agencies possess superior expertise in dealing with the
problems raised in structural reform cases.62 But, Fiss argues, even accepting that
courts have no claim to superior practical expertise, "[t]heir special competency
lies elsewhere, in the domain of constitutional values, a special kind of substantive
rationality, and that expertise is derived from the special quality of the judicial
process--dialogue and independence. 63 Administrative agencies are too tied to
the political process and therefore lack the necessary independence "that is so
essential for giving expression to our constitutional values. 6 4
54 Fiss, Foreword, supra note 5, at 12-13.
5' Id. at 2.
56 id,
57 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
58 Fiss, Foreword, supra note 5, at 13.
'9 Id. at 13.
60 Id. at 14.
61 Id. at 32.
62 Id. at 33-34.
63 Id. at 34.
64 Id. at 35.
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Fiss takes issue with what he views as Fuller's cribbed conception of
adjudication, focusing on Fuller's "participation axiom," i.e., that adjudication is
both defined through and limited by the right of parties to participate in the
process. 6' Fiss notes that structural reform litigation would be impossible if
adjudication were limited to cases in which individuals fully participated in the
process, and he argues that such a requirement would eliminate adjudication's
ability to create public norms and, consequently, its ability to resolve a huge swath
of constitutional and common law cases.66
When it comes to remedies, however, Fiss implicitly acknowledges the limits
of adjudication in terms strikingly similar to Fuller's polycentricity concern.67 Fiss
concedes that "[t]here is no likely connection between the core processes of
adjudication, those that give the judge the special claim to competence, and the
instrumental judgments necessarily entailed in fashioning the remedy. 68 In other
words, the individual terms of the remedy cannot be justified by reasoned
arguments-the same reason Fuller argues prevents adjudication from resolving
polycentric disputes.
69
But Fiss argues that there is a "tight connection between meaning and
remedy., 70 This connection "requires that the decision about remedy be vested in
the judge, the agency assigned to the task of giving meaning to the value through
declaration. 7 1 Delegating the remedial function to some other body "necessarily
creates the risk that the remedy might distort the right, and leave us with something
less than the true meaning of the constitutional value.
7 2
While making the judge responsible for the remedy in complex cases creates a
risk that she will lose some of the distance from the dispute that is central to
independence, Fiss views that as a necessary compromise: "Independence is a
critical element in the process that legitimates the judicial function, for having us
believe that judges can articulate and elaborate the meaning of our constitutional
values, and, yet, to fully discharge that function..,. judges are forced to surrender
some of their independence.,
73
65 Id. at 42.
66 Id. at 43.
67 See id. at 52.
68 Id.
69 Fuller summarizes the "relative incapacity of adjudication to solve 'polycentric'
problems" as rooted in "the incapacity of a given area of human activity to endure a
pervasive delimitation of rights and wrongs [that] is also the measure of its incapacity to
respond to a too exigent rationality, a rationality that demands an immediate and explicit
reason for every step taken." Fuller, Forms and Limits, supra note 4, at 371 (emphasis
added). He goes on to explain that behind "both these incapacities lies the fundamental
truth that certain kinds of human relations are not appropriate raw material for a process of
decision that is institutionally committed to acting on the basis of reasoned argument." Id.
70 Fiss, Foreword, supra note 5, at 52.
71 Id. at 52-53.
72 Id. at 53.
73 Id. at 57.
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C. Reconciling Fuller and Fiss
By focusing on Fuller's participation emphasis, Fiss ignores the strong
similarities in their views of adjudication. Both see the process as distinctive in its
reason-giving capacity. To be sure, Fuller emphasizes the role of the individual in
that distinct process, but it is not participation for its own sake that gives
adjudication its special character and legitimacy; rather, it is "participation through
proofs and arguments. 74 In other words, the ability of individual participation in
the structured setting of adjudication to produce a reasoned result is the basis of its
legitimacy.75
Thus Fuller's concern about polycentricity is "not merely a question of the
huge number of possibly affected parties," but instead relates to the lack of a "clear
issue to which either side [of a polycentric dispute] could direct its proofs and
contentions., 76 In addition, Fuller locates the fundamental problem with
polycentric disputes in the fact that such disputes implicate "the incapacity of a
given area of human activity to endure a pervasive delimitation of rights and
wrongs [that] is also a measure of its incapacity to respond to a too exigent
rationality, a rationality that demands an immediate and explicit reason for every
step taken."77 This is the same concern that Fiss raises regarding the court's
remedial function in a structural reform case: the specifics of the remedy are not
susceptible to reasoned justification.78
In the end, then, Fiss' and Fuller's views of adjudication and its limits have
significant similarities. Both agree that adjudication's legitimacy is tied to its
capacity to produce reasoned decisions -through a structured process that
emphasizes a particular mode of party participation and requires an independent
adjudicator.79 In addition, Fiss and Fuller both believe that adjudication begins to
lose legitimacy to the extent that its results cannot be justified by reasoned
arguments8 and when the processes involved depart from the adversary model.8'
They also acknowledge that complex disputes test the limits of that legitimacy
because the remedies they entail cannot be justified solely by reason; the role of
74 Fuller, Forms and Limits, supra note 4, at 364.
75 Fuller answers "not necessarily" to the hypothetical question of whether a judge's
decision must be accompanied by reasons. Id. at 387. But he goes on to state that "[b]y and
large it seems clear that the fairness and effectiveness of adjudication are promoted by
reasoned opinions. Without such opinions the parties have to take it on faith that their
participation in the decision has been real, that the arbiter has in fact understood and taken
into account their proofs and arguments." Id. at 388 (emphasis added).
76 Id. at 394-95.
" Id. at 371.
78 Fiss, Foreword, supra note 5, at 52.
79 Compare id. at 12-14, with Fuller, Forms and Limits, supra note 4, at 365-69.
80 Compare Fiss, Foreword, supra note 5, at 42, with Fuller, Forms and Limits, supra
note 4, at 368-69.
81 Compare Fiss, Foreword, supra note 5, at 29-30, with Fuller, Forms and Limits,
supra note 4, at 386-88.
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the parties is more complicated.82 And finally, both authors conclude that the
practical need for a judge to assume a more direct role at the remedial phase
compromises the judge's independence.
83
The principal difference between the two approaches is that Fiss is willing to
live with the compromise of permitting courts to fashion remedies in such cases,
because he believes that the norm-creation capacity of adjudication requires courts
to make remedial decisions.8 4 As a consequence, Fiss is critical of ADR processes
out of concern that they will undermine the public values in adjudication.
85
Although Fuller appears to have a much stronger sense than Fiss of the limits
of the ideal form of adjudication, he hints at a willingness to accept alternative
forms of adjudication that fail to fully maximize individual participation. 86 As
noted above, Fuller recognizes that a liberal interpretation of precedent permits a
more flexible view of adjudication "as a collaborative [process] projected through
time" in which "an accommodation of legal doctrine to the complex aspects of a
problem can be made as these aspects reveal themselves in successive cases.,'
87
Fuller also cautions that his analysis of the "pure" form of adjudication that
maximizes individual participation and judge neutrality should not be taken as a
condemnation of every "mixed or 'impure' form of adjudication. '' 88 Fuller explains
that he uses the term "parasitic" to describe such mixed forms in the neutral sense
of a botanist, to imply that they draw "moral sustenance from another form of
order., 89 In other words, Fuller recognizes that the real world often requires forms
of adjudication that do not meet his described ideal. Thus, even for polycentric
disputes, Fuller acknowledges that adjudication can set "ground rules" for a
resolution that would better come from some other, more flexible form. 90
By contrast, Fiss rejects negotiated settlements, and other forms of private
dispute resolution in public law cases because they lack the independence and
reasoned decision-making procedures that legitimate adjudication. 9' The central
82 Compare Fiss, Foreword, supra note 5, at 45-46, with Fuller, Forms and Limits
supra note 4, at 393-95.
83 Compare Fiss, Foreword, supra note 5, at 46, with Fuller, Forms and Limits, supra
note 4, at 394-98.
84 Fiss, Foreword, supra note 5, at 52-53.
85 See id. at 57-58.
86 See Fuller, Forms and Limits, supra note 4, at 371.
87 Id. at 398.
88 Id. at 405.
89 Id. at 406.
90 See Fuller, Forms and Limits supra note 4, at 371 ("Wherever successful human
association depends upon spontaneous and informal collaboration, shifting its forms with
the task at hand, there adjudication is out of place except as it may declare certain ground
rules applicable to a wide variety of activities."); see also Lon L. Fuller, Collective
Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. REv. 3, 34 ("I am not here asserting that an
agency called a 'court' should never under any circumstances undertake to solve a
'polycentric' problem.... All I am urging is that this sort of problem cannot be solved
within the procedural restraints normally surrounding judicial office.").
91 Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 6, at 1085.
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problem with settlement is that it is a purely private bargain with no necessary
connection to the public values inherent in the laws at issue in the dispute. Judicial
approval of a settlement thus fails "to explicate and give force to the values
embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and statues: to interpret
those statutes and give force to the values embodied in them.
92
III. PROMOTING LEGITIMACY THROUGH ADR PROCESSES
A. Sturm 's Deliberative Model
Susan Sturm addresses the Fuller-Fiss debate,93 focusing specifically on the
legitimacy concerns raised in the remedial phase of structural reform litigation.
94
Sturm describes Fuller and Fiss as representative of two competing models of what
she calls the process critique of adjudication.
95
Sturm largely agrees with Fiss's criticisms of the limitations of Fuller's
model.96 But Sturm also finds fault with Fiss's own attachment to the adversary
process, noting that Fiss's unease with the remedial stage of structural reform
litigation illustrates that Fiss and Fuller "share many of the same concerns about
the dangers of the court's departure from the adversary model" of adjudication.
97
She identifies "[t]hree shared norms of judicial legitimacy [that] underlie" Fiss's
and Fuller's models: (1) participation, (2) judicial independence and impartiality,
and (3) reasoned decision making.98
Sturm rejects Fiss's claim that judges must fashion remedies themselves to
preserve the legitimacy of adjudication.99 While she agrees with Fuller and Fiss
that participation plays an important role in legitimating the judicial function,
Sturm argues that participation can be implemented in the remedial phase in a
manner that departs from the traditional adversary model and also enhances the
legitimacy of the process.'00 Rather than relying on indirect representation through
92 id.
93 Others have analyzed the tension (and similarities) between these two classic
approaches to adjudication, but Sturm was the first to develop the possibility of importing
ADR techniques into the adjudicative process while still protecting the legitimating
characteristics Fuller and Fiss identify with adjudication. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 14, at
1310 (describing Fuller's theory of adjudication and Fiss's criticisms and arguing that
"once one gets beyond the caricature of [Fuller's] model, it is apparent, for example, that
Professor Fiss's definition of the purpose of adjudication-giving concrete meaning to
public values-is quite similar to Fuller's").
94 Sturm, supra note 15, at 1359-60.
9' Id. at 1387.
96 Id. (arguing Fiss's "structural reform model offers a powerful critique of the
dispute resolution model and presents a normative theory intended to address and give
legitimacy to the court's role in public law litigation").
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1390.
99 Id.
0o Id. at 1391-96.
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legal professionals, Sturm advocates for maximizing the involvement of parties
and other affected actors, and empowering those individuals and groups to come
up with their own remedial plan.' °' Although this enhances the participation so
valued by Fuller, it requires abandoning his ideal of the two-party dispute and the
identification of clear-cut issues to which those parties can address their
arguments. Similarly, while Sturm's proposal embraces Fiss's understanding that
adjudication is norm-creating, it rejects his insistence that the judge must both
determine liability and develop the remedy. 12
Sturm describes her approach as a "deliberative model of remedial
decisionmaking."'' 0 3 The deliberative model is essentially a proposal to use
mediation to develop the remedy in a structural reform case with an enhanced role
for the court. After determining liability, the court sets up a structured mediation
process. The court first defines the parameters of the process, determined by "the
liability norms that have been violated."'' 0 4 At the prenegotiation stage, the judge
assists in identifying stakeholders and appointing a mediator. The court also
identifies characteristics of an effective consultation process, informs the
participants of the standards it will use to evaluate the result, and sets deadlines. 05
This gives the court greater control over the process and requires specific attention
to the underlying substantive norms.
After negotiations, the parties are required to present the court with a written
agreement and explanation that the stakeholder groups have approved. The court
then holds a public hearing and evaluates the remedy on three levels: (1) the
adequacy of the process, (2) the responsiveness of the remedy to the concerns
raised in the process, and (3) its capacity to address the underlying substantive
norms. 10 6 This ensures that the process is fully participatory and that the result
reflects reasoned decision making tied to the legal norms at stake. While the court
is more directly involved than under stand-alone mediation, its impartiality and
independence is preserved by limiting that role to structuring and evaluating-but
not participating in-the remedial process.
For Sturm, then, adjudication's legitimacy can be protected by using ADR
processes at the remedial stage in a tightly controlled, judicially supervised setting.
Like Fuller, she sees the flexibility, informality, and person-centered aspects of
mediation as distinctly appropriate to addressing the remedial issues in complex
public disputes. But she shares Fiss's concern that using ADR processes risks
compromise or elimination of the norms that adjudication is intended to promote.
The answer is to enhance judicial control of the otherwise private process of
mediation and specifically emphasize the norms at stake throughout the process.
101 Id.
102 See id. at 1431-32.
103 See id at 1428.
'o4 Id. at 1428-29.
105 Id. at 1429-30.
106 Id. at 1431.
2009]
UTAH LAW REVIEW
Sturm is careful to emphasize that her argument is limited to the remedial
context and that extending the deliberative model to liability determinations would
require careful consideration of the differences between the liability determination
and remedial tasks of the court. 10 7 Nonetheless, she notes that the model could
serve a similar legitimating function in the consent decree context. If the
negotiations leading to a consent decree were structured along the lines of the
deliberative model, then judicial approval of that result could derive the same
legitimating benefits despite the lack of a direct court role at the liability phase.10 8
B. A Norm-Creating ADR Process Independent of Litigation
In a more recent article, Sturm, writing with Howard Gadlin, directly
addresses the potential for ADR processes to serve a public norm creation function
independent of adjudication.10 9 Echoing Sturm's description of the deliberative
model, Sturm and Gadlin contend that public norms emerge not only from formal
adjudication but also "when relevant institutional actors develop values or
remedies through an accountable process of principled and participatory decision
making and then adapt these values and remedies to broader *groups or
situations."' 10
ADR processes have this norm-creation potential, provided that they are
structured in a way that links "individual and systemic conflict resolution.""'
Sturm and Gadlin advocate a "combination of root cause analysis and multi-level
remediation" to allow ADR to achieve this potential.1 2 Root-cause analysis makes
implicit organizational norms explicit as part of the resolution of individual
conflicts and in turn creates the opportunity for evaluating whether to reject or
accept those norms. 13 Multi-level remediation requires considering when and
whether to apply the results of an individual resolution to others within an
organization. 1 4 As systemic problems are identified over "time and solutions are
applied system-wide, individual interventions "generate deliberations that produce
an overarching governance structure built around principles, values and lessons"
from individual resolutions." 5 Formal law sets the outer bounds of possible
107 Id. at 1445.
108 Id. at 1446.
'09 Sturm & Gadlin, supra note 6, at 3.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 4.
12 Id. at 53.
113 Id.; see also id. at 4 ("The linchpin of our approach is a form of root cause
analysis, which enables intermediaries to identify and, where possible, address underlying
problems as part of individual case work.").
14 Id. at 54 ("Problems revealed through conflict resolution sometimes give rise to
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resolutions and, at the same time, defines abstractly the values that individual
resolutions must serve.
116
It is evident from Sturm and Gadlin's description of this process that they
believe it can incorporate the same legitimacy characteristics as the deliberative
remedial model. But, rather than requiring direct and specific court involvement to
protect public values, these informal processes are completely free of court
involvement, whether at the liability or remedial stage, and yet they address all
three legitimacy characteristics Sturm identifies with the deliberative model.
Thus, the authors note, "when linked to systemic change, non-adjudicative
conflict resolution can foster the articulation of implicit norms [and] 'reasoned
elaboration and visible expression of public values.'"1 17 Also, "[c]onflict resolution
thus institutionalizes principled decision making that can be generalized within the
community of practice in which it operates." ' 18 Participation is protected through
root-cause analysis, which "incorporates the participation of those affected by,
responsible for and knowledgeable about, the problems at issue," and because
remedies "must emerge from this collective deliberation," in the same manner as
the deliberative model.' 19
Independence and impartiality take on a more complex form. Rather than
requiring the "'detached neutrality"' characteristic of adjudication, Sturm and
Gadlin argue that "'multi-partiality'--critically analyzing a conflict from multiple
vantage points"-can serve the same function.120 This, in turn, reinforces
participation and reasoned decision making because it requires an "institutional
design that builds in participatory accountability-ongoing examination and
justification to participants and a community of practitioners."121
Sturm and Gadlin acknowledge limits to the norm-creation ability of stand-
alone ADR processes, but they argue that the limits "focus attention on the
interdependence of informal and formal conflict resolution systems.' 22 The nature
of the process and, more important, the identity of communities involved in the
process will dictate the relative legitimacy and applicability of the norms
developed through it.
Recognizing the complex relationship between formal and informal dispute
resolution processes moves the debate over the relative capacities of ADR and
formal adjudication beyond the sharp dichotomies reflected in the arguments of
Fiss and Fuller, while recognizing the concerns of both. As noted above, Fuller's
apparent receptivity to hybrid forms of adjudication 123 hints at a similar
understanding that a combination of formal and informal processes can be the most
effective at addressing complex public law issues. But Fuller was plainly
116 Id. at 54-55.
117 Id. at 55.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 56.
120 See id. at 4.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 56.
123 See id.; supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
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concerned that this effectiveness would come at the cost of a loss of legitimacy. In
the same way, Fiss recognizes the potential, at least at the remedial level, for other
processes to displace adjudication, but is deeply concerned about compromising
the legitimacy of the result.
Sturm's deliberative model offers an initial step beyond the stark choices
presented by Fiss and Fuller, but one that still emphasizes the need for direct
oversight and significant court involvement. Sturm and Gadlin's description of
individual ADR processes, conscious of and linked to systemic problem solving,
de-links norm creation from formal adjudication completely while still recognizing
the relationship between formal and informal norm-creation processes.
Part IV analyzes a recent South African Constitutional Court case in which
the court interpreted the right to housing in the South African Constitution to
require that municipalities develop processes for "engaging" with citizens affected
by redevelopment plans that may involve eviction. The case is used to consider
how Sturm and Gadlin's claims about ADR's potential to create public norms
could be extended further. Properly implemented, engagement can be developed
into a hybrid dispute resolution model integrating ADR processes with formal
adjudication in a manner that enhances the legitimacy characteristics identified by
Sturm, while facilitating non-judicial development of public norms for
socioeconomic rights.
IV. DEVELOPING A HYBRID MODEL THROUGH "ENGAGEMENT"
A. The Socioeconomic Rights Debate
Judicial enforcement of socioeconomic rights raises strong objections on
institutional competence and separation of powers grounds. Critics of judicial
enforcement argue that courts are simply not equipped to deal with the complex,
interrelated issues these rights raise. 124 Because enforcement has substantial and
specific effects on the state budget, critics also argue that judicial enforcement
raises insurmountable separation of powers concerns and creates significant
practical problems by restricting the ability of the political branches to set budget
priorities. 125 Notably, Fuller's argument against adjudication of "polycentric"
disputes features prominently in the literature as an argument against
124 See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 2, at 15 (discussing theoretical objections to the
constitutionalization of social and economic rights); see generally Kim Lane Scheppele,
Social Rights in Constitutional Courts: Strategies of Articulation and Strategies of
Enforcement, 4-6 (Oct. 2008) (unpublished draft, copy on file with the author)
(summarizing major criticisms ofjudicial enforcement of social rights).
125 See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 231-33 (discussing the "conventional
argument against judicial enforcement of social and economic rights"); Scheppele, supra
note 124, at 4-5 ("Many commentators believe that courts should not commit large
segments of the state's budget to particular purposes because that is a proper role for a
democratically elected legislature, not for court judgment.").
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constitutionalizing socioeconomic rights and for limiting judicial enforcement
when they are included.
126
These same objections, somewhat paradoxically, also emerge in the literature
surrounding structural reform litigation. Fiss's contention that adjudication is
central to the elaboration of public norms 127 suggests that structural reform
litigation is a genre of disputes where adjudication is particularly important. Yet,
judicial resolution of these disputes has instead prompted widespread criticism of
the legitimacy and institutional capacity of courts to deal with the complex issues
they raise. 28 These are precisely the same objections to judicial enforcement of
socioeconomic rights. 1
29
Recognizing the force of these objections in the socioeconomic rights context,
the South African Constitutional Court has taken a leading role in developing
innovative approaches to enforcement that attempt to mitigate institutional
competence and separation of powers concerns. The most celebrated example of
this innovation is the court's first housing rights case, Government of the Republic
of South Africa v Grootboom.'
30
126 See, e.g., supra note 44 and accompanying text.
127 See Fiss, Foreword, supra note 5, at 12-13.
128 See Sturm, supra note 15, at 1379. Sturm notes that "[t]he court's dynamic and
activist role in formulating public law remedies has triggered a heated debate among
academics, judges, and politicians concerning the proper role of the court." Id. She
identifies four major criticisms:
1. The courts' public remedial activities fail to conform to the standards of
legitimate judicial decisionmaking;
2. The courts violate principles of federalism and separation of powers...;
3. The courts are not competent to perform the role of public remedial
formulation; and
4. The courts are abusing their power and acting unfairly in the execution
of their public remedial function.
Id.
129 Compare id. (listing the four objections described in the immediately preceding
footnote), with TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 231-33 (quoting Frank R. Cross's summary of
the arguments against socioeconomic rights in The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L.
REV. 857, 887 (2001), which includes the arguments that enforcement of socioeconomic.
rights "raises the spectre of 'the courts running everything-raising taxes and deciding how
the money should be spent"' and that "[jiudges ... are ill-suited for the evaluation and
making of the trade-offs implied by many positive rights" (internal quotations omitted)),
and Michelman, supra note 2, at 15 ("[I]t is clear that the debate [over socioeconomic
rights] throughout has been centered on a concern about the place and work of the judiciary
in the democratic political order. We seem to think that the problem with
constitutionalizing social rights comes down mainly, if not solely to a matter of separation
of powers.").
"0 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) (S. Afr.); see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 233-
36 (analyzing Grootboom and praising the court's "adoption of a novel and highly
promising approach to judicial protection of socio-economic rights"); Davis, supra note 10,
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The plaintiffs in Grootboom were desperately poor members of an informal
community who had established makeshift housing on a public sports field after
their eviction from nearby private land. They brought suit against the City of Cape
Town claiming that the city's failure to provide housing violated their right to
access to adequate housing under section 26(2) of the constitution, as well as the
rights of the children in the community to shelter under section 28(1)(c).' 3 1
The court held that the city violated the general right to housing in section 26
because, although it had developed constitutionally adequate housing programs
addressing medium- and long-term needs, the city's plans lacked any provision for
short-term, emergency needs like those of the Grootboom community.'3 2 The
court, however, limited its relief to a declaration that the state housing program in
the Cape municipal region was unconstitutional in that it "failed to make
reasonable provision within its available resources for people in the Cape
Metropolitan area with no access to land, no roof over their heads, and who were
living in intolerable conditions or crisis situations."' 33 The court refused to issue
more specific requirements and dissolved an injunction requiring the city to report
back to court on its progress implementing a new housing plan.13 4 The city was
thus left to determine for itself how best to cure the constitutional defect with no
direct court oversight.
In large part due to the court's limited remedy, Grootboom has been described
variously as a "dialogic,"'' 35 "weak form," ' 13 6 or "administrative law"'1 37 approach.
These labels all highlight the fact that the court's use of a general declaration
significantly limited the court's role and largely left policy development to the
political branches. For those same reasons, however, critics of the court's approach
in Grootboom have charged it with proceduralizing these rights by refusing to give
them any substantive content. 
138
at 702 (noting that the result in Grootboom has been "welcomed"); Mark V. Tushnet,
Marbury v. Madison Around the World, 71 TENN. L. REv. 251, 270-71 (2004) (discussing
Grootboom).
131 Grootboom (11) BCLR 1169 at para. 12.
132 Id. at paras. 95-96.
133 Id. at para. 99.
134 id.
135 Rosalind Dixon, Creating Dialogue About Socioeconomic Rights: Strong-Form
Versus Weak-Form Judicial Review Revisited, 5 INT'L CONST. L.J. 391, 417 (2007)
(arguing that the court should adopt a "dialogue model," which is "fully consistent with the
approach the Court in TAC suggested might be appropriate in future cases").
136 TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 242-43.
137 SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 234 ("What the South African Constitutional Court
has basically done is to adopt an administrative law model of socioeconomic rights.").
138 See, e.g., Danie Brand, The Proceduralisation of South African Socio-Economic
Rights Jurisprudence, or 'What Are Socio-Economic Rights For?,' in RIGHTS AND
DEMOCRACY IN A TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTION 33, 36 (Henk Botha et al., eds., 2003)
(describing the court's approach as "limited") [hereafter Brand, Proceduralisation]; David
Bilchitz, Towards a Reasonable Approach to the Minimum Core: Laying the Foundations
for Future Socioeconomic Rights Jurisprudence, 19 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 9-10 (2003);
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These critics focus on an important interpretive move made by the court in
Grootboom and other cases. Most of the socioeconomic rights in the South African
Constitution contain what is called an "internal limitations" provision. The right
itself is stated in the first clause. For example, section 26 provides: "1. Everyone
has the right to have access to adequate housing."'139 That right is then qualified in
the second clause (the "internal limitation"), which states: "2. The state must take
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve
progressive realisation of this right."'140 The court has consistently held that these
two provisions must be read together.'
4 1
Critics argue that the court should interpret the right itself independent of the
limitation. 142 This would require a two-step process in which the court first
declares what the right to housing requires in the abstract, and then considers cost-
based justifications for any particular program that falls short of this ideal.As one
critic describes it, this approach "view[s] resource scarcity not as qualifying the
ambit [of the right] but rather as limiting the extent to which its implied benefits
may be demanded at a given time."
143
In addition to limiting the substantive scope of these rights, critics charge that
the court's refusal to interpret the right separate from the limitation fails to give
adequate guidance to the political branches and potential claimants. They claim
"there is a need for the Court to clarify the State's obligations imposed by socio-
economic rights."'144 Without such guidance, "the state is left with an amorphous
standard by which to judge its own conduct" and is unable "to assess its conduct
against clear benchmarks."'
145
Critics also argue that the court's failure to give substantive content to these
rights renders its decisions arbitrary and illegitimate. As one commentator puts it,
the reasonableness standard adopted by the court "seems to stand for whatever the
Court regards as desirable features of state policy. The problem with this approach
is that it lacks a principled basis upon which to found decisions in socio-economic
rights cases."'
146
Marius Pieterse, Resuscitating Socio-Economic Rights: Constitutional Entitlements to
Health Care Services, 22 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 473, 473-74 (2006) ("[T]he Court's
rejection of what can be called a 'minimum core approach' to the enforcement of ss 26(1)
and 27(1) of the Constitution in favour of an administrative law-like 'reasonableness
approach' . . . has been much lamented."). Mark Kende provides a comprehensive survey
of, and response to, these criticisms. KENDE, supra note 11, at 243-85.
'3 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 §26.
140 Id.
141 See, e.g., Gov't of the Republic of S. Aft. v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169
(CC) at para. 33 (S. Afr.).
142 See, e.g., Pieterse, supra note 138, at 481.
14 Id. at 480.





These criticisms of the court's enforcement approach reflect Fiss's focus on
the public function of adjudication and the unique role of courts in that process. In
effect, the court's critics are saying, as does Fiss, that only the court has the power
and responsibility to interpret these rights and establish constitutional values.
Without an authoritative court interpretation, the government cannot determine its
constitutional responsibilities and citizens cannot challenge government programs
and actions that fall short. Likewise, Fiss's related concern about the threatened
legitimacy of adjudication when the court does not dictate the remedy-because
we might be left "with something less than the true meaning of the constitutional
value"147-is reflected in the criticism of Grootboom's limited remedy and the
court's broader refusal to define the meaning of the right and the remedy
separately in each case.
Finally, the charge that the court's refusal to declare the content of the right
makes it impossible to test its decisions in each case against any objective standard
reflects Fiss's emphasis that the legitimacy of adjudication rests principally on the
fact that a judicial decision is the result of reasoned argument (dialogue) and is
"justiffied]... in terms of the norms of the constitutional system."'1
48
But Fiss's recognition that a court's legitimacy is diminished when it fashions
the details of a remedy because those details represent a choice among competing
options for implementing the constitutional norm 149 points toward a flaw in the
criticisms of the Constitutional Court's approach as well. Fiss acknowledges that
"[t]he task of discovering the meaning of constitutional values such as equality,
due process, or property, is ...quite different from choosing or fashioning the
most effective strategy for actualizing those values."'' ° This is because "there is no
likely connection between the core processes of adjudication, those that give the
judge the special claim of competence, and the instrumental judgments necessarily
entailed in fashioning the remedy."'
' 5 1
This gap between the abstract right and the practical remedy collapses when it
comes to socioeconomic rights in a way that makes it almost impossible to
disentangle the two. For example, take the right to health care. In contrast to the
equality example used by Fiss, where the right itself could be interpreted to mean
''racial equality," which would then require choosing among a range of policy
147 Fiss, Foreword, supra note 5, at 53.
148 Id. at 45.
149 Id. at 49 ("The judge must search for the 'best' remedy, but since his judgment
must incorporate such open-ended considerations as effectiveness and fairness, and since
the threat and constitutional value that occasions intervention can never be defined with
great precision, the particular choice of remedy can never be defended with any certitude."
(emphasis added)).
"0 Id. at 51.
5 ' Id. at 52.
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choices to implement that interpretation, 152 it is impossible to define the right to
"health care" without reference to specific policies. 1
53
This is illustrated by criticisms of the Constitutional Court's interpretation of
the right to health care in Treatment Action Campaign.154 Tracking the interpretive
debate just described, critics argue the court should have defined the right to health
care independent of the limitation. 155 This would mean deciding, for example,
"[w]hat are the services to which one is entitled to claim access? Do these services
involve preventative [sic] medicine, such as immunizations, or treatment for
existing diseases or both? Does the right entitle one to primary, secondary, or
tertiary health care services, or all of these?"'156 In other words, defining the right
necessarily entails prescribing particular policies. 157
Furthermore, as Fiss also emphasizes, courts are in no better position (and
likely a worse one) than the political branches to make the instrumental
assessments necessary to determine whether a particular health care policy is more
or less likely to be effective. Like the decisions over allocation of public goods that
Fuller cites, interpreting the right to health care necessarily requires courts to make
contingent policy decisions that will almost certainly shift over time and demand
an intimate, real-time understanding of the specific conditions on the. ground to be
effective.
158
On the one hand, the "raging indeterminacy" of socioeconomic rights lends
support to the court's decision to interpret the right and the limitation together.
159
Defining the right in the abstract requires articulating substantive policies in light
of specific conditions in particular contexts. More important, however, the
indeterminacy heightens the legitimacy deficit that Fiss acknowledges the remedial
function creates for adjudication in complex disputes like these, due to the loss of
judicial independence, and the lack of a necessary confiection between the
constitutional value and the specifics of the remedy. 160 Thus, accepting Fiss's view
of adjudication's legitimacy, there is at least no greater legitimacy problem in the
152 Id. at 52-53.
153 Sandra Liebenberg makes a similar point when she observes that the
Constitutional Court's enforcement approach implies "that there is no bright-line boundary
between law and policy, and that substantive evaluative choices will have to be made
regarding when and how the courts should intervene in policy choices which impact on
people's socio-economic welfare." Sandra Liebenberg, Socioeconomic Rights: Revisiting
the Reasonableness Review/Minimum Core Debate, in CONSTITUTIONAL CONVERSATIONS
303, 308 (Stu Woolman & Michael Bishop eds., 2008).
154 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) (S. Afr.).
155 Bilchitz, supra note 138, at 6.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Others have recognized these same institutional-competence problems with
judicial enforcement. See, e.g., CASS SUNSTEIN & STEVEN HOLMES, THE COST OF RIGHTS
126-27 (1999) (noting that judges "lack the fact-finding capacity .. .that would justify
their making particular allocative decisions").
'59 See Michelman, supra note 2, at 30-31.
160 See Fiss, Foreword, supra note 5, at 46.
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court's current approach than if the court were to interpret the right before
considering whether the limitations clause justified a departure from that ideal.
Any declaration of the meaning of the right to housing would be a policy proposal,
i.e., a remedy, and thus would entail the kind of instrumental judgments that
diminish the legitimacy of the result.
Sturm's proposal that mediation can be used in -the remedial phase in a
manner that still protects the essential legitimating features of adjudication, and
Sturm and Gadlin's extension of that argument to ADR processes independent of
adjudication, suggest a way out of the legitimacy dilemma posed by
socioeconomic rights. At the same time, using ADR processes offers a possible
solution to the institutional competence concerns they raise.
The Constitutional Court's most recent housing rights decision in Occupiers
of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg involved an interim order requiring a
form of negotiation/mediation, which the court calls "engagement. 16' The court
constitutionalized the engagement requirement in all future housing rights cases.
After a brief description of that decision and the litigation that led to it, the
following subsections consider how this requirement might satisfy the
characteristics for a norm-creating ADR process described by Sturm and Gadlin,
and thereby enhance the legitimacy of the court's role in enforcing these rights.
The hybrid dispute resolution process that engagement could become is fully
consistent with the legitimacy norms Sturm and Gadlin identify, and it reflects the
kind of hybrid process Fuller implies is most suitable for resolving polycentric
disputes of this kind.
B. City of Johannesburg and the Engagement Remedy
City of Johannesburg began as a series of emergency applications in the
Witwatersrand High Court by the City of Johannesburg to evict over 300 people
from six properties in inner-city Johannesburg. 162 The city sought these evictions
as part of a broader regeneration strategy, one aspect of which was the
identification, clearance, and ultimate redevelopment of more than 200 "bad"
buildings with some 67,000 occupants in the inner-city district.
63
The targeted buildings clearly created unsafe and unsanitary living
conditions.' 64 Notwithstanding the legitimate concerns over the health and safety
hazards the buildings presented, the city's eviction program was outrageous. The
city implemented the evictions by filing form applications with very little notice to
161 2008 (5) BCLR 475 (CC) at para. 5 (S. Aft.).
162 City of Johannesburg v Rand Props. (Pty) Ltd. 2006 (6) BCLR 728 (W) at para. 2
(S. Aft.).
163 See CENTRE ON HOUSING RIGHTS AND EVICTIONS, ANY ROOM FOR THE POOR?
FORCED EVICTIONS IN JOHANNESBURG, SOUTH AFRICA (March 8, 2005), at 41-46, 60-64
(describing the regeneration plan and the practice of forced evictions) [hereinafter Any
Room?].
164 See Rand Props. 2006 (6) BCLR 728 at para. 8.
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actual occupants and in most cases gaining summary eviction with no hearing.'
65
The city would then send in teams of workers dressed in red, known as "red ants,"
to forcibly evict residents. The Geneva-based Center on Housing Rights and
Evictions (COHRE) published an extensive report describing the abuses and
outlining legal and policy arguments against the program.
166
Several groups organized the residents of six targeted buildings to oppose the
applications in their cases. 167 COHRE had partnered with the Centre for Applied
Legal Studies (CALS) in drafting the initial report criticizing the eviction
program. 168 CALS then coordinated the litigation strategy. 169 Other groups were
also active in the effort, including the Community Law Centre, 170 a public interest
research and advocacy group based at the University of the Western Cape. Several
of these groups filed amicus curiae briefs in support of the residents.171
The High Court (the trial-level court in the South African system) was
extremely sympathetic to the residents' arguments. The court rejected the city's
eviction application and issued a broad order holding that the city had violated
section 26 by pursuing these evictions without a plan to house the evicted
residents, as required by Grootboom and related legislation. 7 2 The court also
enjoined the city from seeking to evict the residents, and it ordered the city to
develop a plan for housing these and other residents. Notably, the order
specifically required the city to relocate residents within the inner-city district. 
173
The city appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA). The SCA reversed
the high court, finding that the evictions were constitutionally permissible but
triggered a much more limited responsibility by the city to relocate the displaced
residents. 174
165 Any Room?, supra note 163, at 60-64 (describing in detail the city's typical
eviction procedures).
166 Id.
167 City of Johannesburg v Rand Props. (Pty) Ltd. 2007 (6) BCLR 643 (SCA) at para.
13 (S. Aft.).
168 See Any Room?, supra note 163, at 5 n.1; see also Press Release, COHRE/CALS,
Jo-Burg City Housing Policy Goes to Bloemfontein (Feb. 20, 2007) ("The plight of [the
residents] was first brought to public attention in a May 2005 report co-authored by
researchers from the Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS) and COHRE ... "
available at http://www.law.wits.ac.za/cals/.
169 See CENTRE FOR APPLIED LEGAL STUDIES, ANNUAL REPORT 1, 26-27 (2006),
available at http://web.wits.ac.za/NR/rdonlyres/42578E36-FB69-4457-B4B7-0D
4 7 15
D1AD9F/0/2006AnnualReport.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2009).
170 Community Law Centre, http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/Court-
Interventions (click "read more" under "Rand Properties - right to adequate housing and
evictions") (last visited Sept. 1, 2009).
171 Id.
172 See City of Johannesburg v Rand Props. (Pty) Ltd. 2006 (6) BCLR 728 (W) at
para. 65 (S. Afr.).
"' Id. at 67.




The residents appealed the SCA's order to the Constitutional Court, which
accepted the application in May 2007.1' The court heard oral argument on August
28, 2007, and two days later it issued a remarkable interim order requiring the
parties to "engage with each other meaningfully ... in an effort to resolve the
differences and difficulties aired in this application in light of the values of the
Constitution, the constitutional and statutory duties of the municipality and the
rights and duties of the citizens concerned."' 176 The court also ordered the parties to
file affidavits reporting the results of the negotiations with the court approximately
one month later, on October 3, 2007)
77
After requesting several deadline extensions, the parties eventually reached a
partial settlement that included the following provisions: in the short-term, the city
agreed to cease its eviction attempts and to take specific measures to make the
existing buildings safer and more habitable by cleaning the buildings and
providing sanitation services, access to water, and functioning toilets. 178 Before
relocating the residents from the buildings designated for redevelopment, the city
agreed to refurbish several other buildings in inner-city Johannesburg to at least
provide "security against eviction; access to sanitation; access to potable water;
access to electricity for heating, lighting and cooking" 179 and to limit any rental
fees to no more than 25 percent of the occupants' monthly income.' 80 Finally, the
city agreed to consult with the residents on the "provision of suitable permanent
housing solutions . . . having regard to applicable national, provincial and
municipal housing policies."
181
Despite agreeing to these remarkable terms, both sides pressed the court to
decide the broader issue of whether the city was in compliance with section 26 and
Grootboom's mandate to develop a plan that addresses the emergency needs of
individuals like the residents in this case. 182 The city submitted a "Draft Inner City
Housing Plan" along with its affidavit reporting the results of the negotiation, and
it requested that the court find that the plan satisfied constitutional obligations
under section 26.183 The residents filed a supplementary affidavit objecting to the
city's submission of the new plan in the context of an affidavit that was intended to
175 See Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Twp. and 197 Main Street Johannesburg
v City of Johannesburg Interim Order Dated 30 August 2007, available at
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/10731 .PDF.
176 Id. at para. 1.
177 Id. at para. 3.
178 Settlement Agreement Between City of Johannesburg and the Occupiers of 51
Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg (Oct 29, 2007) at paras.
2-4 (copy on file with the author).
179 Id. at para. 6.
'80 Id. at para. 7.
'81 Id.'at para. 18.
182 Id. at paras. 3, 10.
183 Karen Brit Affidavit, available at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za (search
"Olivia Road" within "Cases" and select "First Respondent's Supplementary Affidavit"
under "Pleadings and Documents") (Aug. 2007).
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be only a report of the parties' negotiated settlement.184 Nonetheless, the residents
continued to urge the court to determine whether the city was in compliance with
section 26 and asked for additional time to respond to the city's new plan.
185
The Constitutional Court issued its final opinion and order on February 19,
2008. The court specifically refused to deal with the residents' broader claim that
the city still lacked a comprehensive housing plan as required by Grootboom.
Citing the city's commitment in the settlement agreement to develop a long-term
housing plan in consultation with the residents, the court found that "[t]here is
every reason to believe that negotiations will continue in good faith."'186 The court
noted that the city's position had evolved considerably as demonstrated by its
"willingness to engage," and the court was optimistic that "[t]here is no reason to
think that future engagement will not be meaningful and will not lead to a
reasonable result."'' 87 The court also emphasized that court intervention remains an
enforcement option "if this course becomes necessary.'
188
The court then formalized the negotiation/mediation requirement, calling it
"engagement."' 189 It noted that it had called for versions of engagement in earlier
cases. 190 In particular, in another eviction case, Port Elizabeth Municipality v
Various Occupiers, the court stated:
In seeking to resolve the above contradictions, the procedural and
substantive aspects of justice and equity cannot always be separated. The
managerial role of the courts may need to find expression in innovative
ways. Thus one potentially dignified and effective mode of achieving
sustainable reconciliations of the different interests involved is to
encourage and require the parties to engage with each other in a pro-
active and honest endeavour to find mutually acceptable solutions.
Wherever possible, respectful face-to-face engagement or mediation
through a third party should replace arms-length combat by intransigent
opponents. 191
The court found that a range of constitutional provisions, including the state's
obligation to "encourage the involvement of communities and community
184 Moray Hathorn Affidavit, available at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za
(search "Olivia Road" within "Cases" and select "Applicant's Supplementary Affidavit"
under "Pleadings and Documents") (Oct. 2007).
185 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg 2008 (5) BCLR 475 (CC) at
paras. 31-34 (S. Afr.).
186 Id. at para. 34.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id. at paras. 9-23.
190 Id. at paras. 10-12.
191 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) at
para. 39 (S. Aft.).
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organizations in local government," 192 as well as the rights to human dignity 93 and
life194 broadly require engagement with citizens affected by state policies. 195 The
court then described in more specific terms what engagement should entail.
First, in accordance with Grootboom, the court emphasized that "section
26(2) mandates that the response of any municipality to potentially homeless
people with whom it engages must also be reasonable."'' 96 Reasonableness is
context-specific and permits a range of substantive outcomes: "It may in some
circumstances be reasonable to make permanent housing available and, in others,
to provide no housing at all. The possibilities between these extremes are almost
endless."
'1 97
Second, in most cases, and in particular where a large-scale program is
involved, engagement must be more than a merely "ad hoc" process.
198
Emphasizing that "[i]t must have been apparent [from the outset of the city's
regeneration strategy planning] that the eviction of a large number of people was
inevitable," the court also noted that "[i]f structures had been put in place with
competent sensitive council workers skilled in engagement, the process could have
begun when the strategy was adopted."' 99 Thus, engagement must be incorporated
at the outset of any long-term planning process and must involve a trained cadre of
government employees.
Third, the court recognized that "[p]eople about to be evicted may be so
vulnerable that they may not be able to understand the importance of engagement
and may refuse to take part in the process.,, 200 These vulnerable groups "must not
be regarded as a disempowered mass., 201 Instead, the state must make every effort
to engage, and these groups may require assistance from civil society groups. For
this reason, the court specifically recognized that "[c]ivil society organisations that
support the peoples' claims should preferably facilitate the engagement process in
every possible way. 20 2
Finally, the court established what amounts to a public reporting requirement
for the government after any engagement process. Emphasizing that "secrecy is
counter-productive to the process of engagement," the court stated, "[T]he
provision of a complete and accurate account of the process of engagement
including at least the reasonable efforts of the municipality with that process would
ordinarily be essential. 20 3 Courts are then required to consider "[w]hether there
192 Occupiers of51 Olivia Road 2008 (5) BCLR 475 at para. 16.
193 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 10.
194 Id. § 11.
195 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road 2008 (5) BCLR 475 at para. 16.
196 Id. at para. 18.
197 id.
198 Id.
199 Id. at para. 19.
200 Id. at para. 15.
201 Id. at para. 19.
202 Id.
203 Id. at para. 21.
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had been meaningful engagement between a city and the resident about to be
rendered homeless" when considering a challenge under section 26.204
C. Engagement as a Hybrid Mechanism for Developing Constitutional Norms
On the one hand, the court's description of the engagement process looks
much like Sturm and Gadlin's model of a norm-creating ADR process. It pushes
the responsibility for developing the substantive content of section 26 into the
political sphere and adopts a largely private, party-directed mechanism for doing
so. 20 5 Unlike their model, which operates separate from the judicial system,
20 6
engagement remains tied to the courts in ways that make it more of a hybrid
between the pure ADR process they describe and pure adjudication. The hybrid
nature of engagement enhances its legitimacy and its norm-creation capacity in
several ways.
The Constitutional Court created a structure that is really an expanded version
of Sturm's deliberative model, but one that operates without a court liability
determination. Therefore, it tracks Sturm's suggestion that the model might be
extended to consent decrees.20 7 Rather than setting specific guidelines in each case,
as under Sturm's model, the court instead sets more general guidelines for the
engagement process, as it did in City of Johannesburg.20 8 The guidelines will,
presumably, be refined and expanded in cases that come before the court where
engagement was tried and failed. This gives courts the power to structure the
engagement process in ways that ensure attention to the values these rights protect,
as Sturm and Fiss emphasize. Although this structuring role operates over a longer
period and across multiple cases rather than within a single one, it is nonetheless
similar to the structuring role Sturm assigns to the court in the deliberative model,
and thus allows the courts to refine the process to ensure attention to public values.
The engagement remedy also circumscribes courts' initial role in most cases
and provides the baseline-setting role to which Fuller argues courts should limit
themselves when dealing with highly polycentric issues.20 9 Rather than setting
direct policy through substantive interpretation of section 26, the courts instead
establish the ground rules for a procedure by which the parties themselves, assisted
by civil society, can develop the specific policies required to provide access to
adequate housing.21 °
204 Id.
205 Compare supra Part IV.B, with supra Part III.B.
206 Sturm and Gadlin, supra note 6, at 6.
207 See Sturm, supra note 15, at 1446 (suggesting that "[c]onsent decrees reached
through processes that conform to the deliberative model may satisfy basic requirements of
legitimate judicial intervention").
208 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg (5) BCLR 475 (CC) at para.
10 (S. Afr.).
209 See Fuller, Forms and Limits, supra note 4, at 398.
210 See Bone, supra note 14, at 1318 (arguing that in a case challenging the
constitutionality of the conditions at a special-needs school, "Fuller would have had little
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The public reporting requirement plays several important roles. First, by
requiring the state to develop a complete record that will be the basis for potential
judicial review it ensures that, in failed engagements, courts will have the
information necessary to develop the process itself in ways that protect public
values.
Second, because the parties know that they must develop a record that a court
may ultimately review for compliance with procedural and substantive obligations,
the public reporting requirement creates a strong incentive for engagements to
incorporate these public values throughout the process. Both sides will be looking
toward a potential endgame that involves representations to a court and will want
to be able to demonstrate that their actions and proposals serve the broader values
of the right.
This requirement also emphasizes the role of reasoned arguments in the
process that is a central legitimating characteristic for both Fuller and Fiss. Fuller
asserts that adjudication gives institutional expression to reason because "a
decision which is the product of reasoned argument must be prepared itself to meet
the test of reason., 21 1 As a result, "issues tried before an adjudicator tend to
become claims of right or accusations of fault. 212 The public reporting
requirement gives the parties incentive to make reasoned arguments and claims of
rights because they know those arguments may be assessed by the courts and
certainly will be subject to analysis and critique by the public at the end of the
process.
This aspect of the engagement process comes with the cost of eliminating the
confidentiality that many argue is an important feature of ADR processes and is
necessary to avoid position-based bargaining.213 The potential for position-based
bargaining is real, but disclosure of the engagement process is critical to protecting
the legitimacy norms associated with litigation. Confidentiality also may be less
important in this setting than in others.
First, one of the principal benefits of confidentiality in private disputes is the
opportunity to avoid public disclosure of the terms of the settlement itself. But the
policies that result from successful engagement will be public in any event, thus
eliminating this potential concern.
Second, the need for potential court oversight is crucial to ensuring that
municipalities engage seriously and also to providing the opportunity for public
critique of the results. Others have argued for limited disclosure in court-connected
difficulty with ordering new procedures [for the provision of new facilities and personnel],
but he certainly would have worried about the judge deciding on the facilities and
personnel...").
211 Fuller, Forms and Limits, supra note 4, at 366-67.
212 Id. at 369.
213 See, e.g., Maureen A. Weston, Checks on Participant Conduct in Compulsory
ADR: Reconciling the Tension in the Need for Good-Faith Participation, Autonomy and
Confidentiality, 76 IND. L.J. 591, 633 (2001) ("Confidentiality in ADR is popularly viewed
as crucial to the effectiveness of ADR and to participants' willingness to use such
procedures.").
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214mediation to protect against potential abuse of ADR processes. In the
engagement context, those concerns are heightened. The potential for bargaining
disparity between the parties is much greater. Moreover, a public process and the
potential for judicial review of that process are necessary to make the remedy both
effective and responsive to the public values at stake.
In the end, the hybrid nature of engagement-the oscillation between a party-
controlled process and court direction-permits the process to operate across
public and private spheres in a way that combines the flexibility of ADR methods
that Fuller emphasizes and, at the same time, draws on the legitimating
characteristics of adjudication. 5 Rather than creating a parallel process, as Sturm
and Gadlin describe, engagement remains tied to the courts and permits periodic
court intervention across multiple cases.
Successful engagements will never reach the courts, but many engagements
certainly will. Those cases will allow courts to provide guidance on how the
engagement process should be structured and what substantive outcomes are
constitutionally permissible. These decisions will then serve as guidelines for
future engagements, thus creating a multi-level remediation process that Sturm and
Gadlin emphasize is necessary for individual resolutions to become precedents in
other cases. Rather than operating independently of courts, however, engagement
ties the process back to courts and creates the opportunity to address the results of
failed engagements and tweak the process to deal with problems they raise.
1. Successful Engagements
But what happens with successful engagements? Cases where the process
works and the settlement never reaches a court directly implicate Fiss's concern
that private 'interests may trump public values, because there is no independent
review of the result. As an initial matter, in City of Johannesburg the court
recognized Fiss's concern and emphasized that "[i]t will not always be appropriate
for a court to approve all agreements entered into consequent upon
engagement. 2 16 The court thus signaled to parties in all future engagements that
their efforts must be attentive to the public values at stake, or risk rejection if the
214 See id. at 594.
215 See Melvin Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness, and the Consultative
Process, 92 HARV. L. REv. 410, 430 (1978). In this essay, published as a commentary on
(and in the same issue as) The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, Melvin Eisenberg
suggests that a hybrid combination of "good faith negotiation based on... relevant legal
principles" and connected to the possibility for court review may be "an optimum form of
ordering" in public law cases with poly centric dimensions. Id. Although Eisenberg argues
that the need for this hybrid approach risks undermining the moral force of adjudication as
defined by Fuller, it can be argued that the hybridity can instead preserve the legitimacy of
adjudication by relying on ADR processes to deal with the polycentric dimensions of the
dispute.




dispute comes to court. Each engagement will take place in the "shadow" of the
possibility of litigation and court involvement, thus building in an incentive to
incorporate these values at the start.
More important, several features of the process the Constitutional Court
described track the requirements Sturm identifies as central to a legitimate
outcome for Fuller and Fiss 217 and allow for incorporation of the features of the
public norm creating ADR process Sturm and Gadlin describe. 218 To begin with,
the court's demand that the state involve civil society organizations in the
engagement process protects the participation principle Sturm identified.219 Civil
society organizations active on housing issues will have broader perspectives and
will understand how the results of individual negotiations may affect the broader
policy landscape. Thus, these groups can negotiate for policy changes that extend
beyond the individuals involved in the specific engagement. 210 At the same time,
these groups can help alleviate the disparity in bargaining capacity between the
municipality and vulnerable populations.
The public reporting requirement, even absent direct review by a court, also
increases participation at a broader level by permitting any interested group or
individual to assess (and criticize) the result of an individual engagement and even
the process that led to it. Although public assessment is unlikely to affect the
outcome of what would be at that point a complete engagement, it can serve the
same refining function as court review in the longer term by offering suggestions
for improving the process or reasons why the next engagement should be more
protective of the values of the specific right. In this way, the public report
generated in a successful engagement serves some of the same functions as the
reasoned decision of a court: announcing the terms of the agreement and stating
how those terms are consistent with the requirements of the right involved.
The broad participation that engagement entails-bringing outside groups into
the process and permitting review and critique by the general public after the
fact-creates the "multi-partiality" that Sturm and Gadlin argue can substitute for
judicial independence in the ADR context.22 1 Rather than a single, independent
judge assessing the outcome for consistency with public values, engagement
encourages a principled result protecting those values through the incorporation of
multiple, experienced actors, as well as the integration of a range of perspectives
and a critique of the process through public reporting.
217 See discussion supra Part III.A. Sturm identifies three shared characteristics:
"participation, impartiality, and reasoned decisionmaking." Sturm, supra note 15, at 1382-
83.
218 See discussion supra Part III.B.
219 See Sturm, supra note 15, at 1410.
220 Sturm and Gadlin suggest that an additional benefit to including repeat players
like civil society organizations in the negotiation process is increased legitimacy: "[P]anels
of independent physicians and community advocates operating as third party intermediaries
carry substantial weight and bring legitimacy to the process of conflict resolution and
systems intervention." Sturm & Gadlin, supra note 6, at 48.
221 See id. at 56.
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More important, the public reporting requirement, combined with another,
previously underutilized constitutional provision, creates a powerful tool for using
individual engagements to establish broad norms across engagements. In
combination, these features create incentives for the municipality and the affected
residents to pay consistent attention during the negotiation process to the public
norms these rights enforce. They also can be used to make the results of single
engagements repeatable, where appropriate, in the same way that Sturm and
Gadlin argue individual conflict resolutions should be adapted to establish broader
policies within an organization.222
Each of the socioeconomic rights, including section 26, requires "progressive
realisation" of the right over time.223 Progressive realization requires,' at a
minimum, that the state cannot decrease the level of benefit provided without
substantial reason.224 The public reporting requirement means municipalities must
document their engagement efforts and results.
The reasonableness and resources limitations in section 26225 give the
government flexibility to argue that a different level of benefit or modified
program is more appropriate to address the circumstances in a dispute, but it must
support those claims in the engagement process. During engagement, residents and
civil society groups will have the opportunity to argue for alternatives not
considered by the government that may adequately address the basis for that
modified program or diminished benefit.
The City of Johannesburg's inner-city regeneration project provides a simple
example of this effect. Continuation of this project will require a significant
number of additional evictions. Following the court's decision, the city must
develop a plan for engaging in a systematic way with the residents of the buildings
targeted for redevelopment. Those residents can now point to the settlement
agreement the city reached as a benchmark for their cases. The city will have to
justify offering lesser accommodation to these other residents as a matter of good
negotiation practice and because the city knows that the engagement process is
subject to court review if it breaks down.
Up until this point, the court's controversial decision to link the substantive
right to the internal limitations clause when interpreting socioeconomic rights has
222 See id. at 54.
223 S. AFR.. CONST. 1996 § 26.
224 See Gov't of the Republic of S. Aft. v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) at
para. 45 (S. Aft.). The court adopted the interpretation of "progressive realisation" put forth
in paragraph 9 of the general comment to Article 2.1 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: "'Moreover, any deliberately retrogressive measures
... would require the most careful consideration and would need to be fully justified by
reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the
full use of the maximum available resources."' Id.
225 Id. at paras. 19, 21.
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been largely criticized as diminishing its force.226 But through engagement, the
progressive realization qualifier has the potential to act as a powerful tool for
giving section 26 substantive content--content, however, that is developed by the
state itself through negotiation with affected citizens and civil society groups rather
than mandated by courts.
For this structured approach to engagement to work effectively, it must
include not only a process for documenting the individual engagements, which the
court recognized, but also a publicly accessible repository of the reports. This will
give municipalities the longitudinal information they will require to make
engagement more than a merely ad hoc process. More important, access to the
results of engagements is necessary for individual engagements to serve as
potential precedents for future engagements and also to allow for public
assessment of the results.
Civil society can play a key role here as well. Groups that are consistently
involved in engagements can help develop appropriate record-keeping guidelines
for each engagement. Those same groups can then press the government to make
those records publicly available and, in turn, use those same records as the basis
for negotiations in subsequent engagements.
Over time, then, engagement can establish a generalizable, but still flexible,
set of process norms and substantive requirements for section 26 that can be
applied and modified in later cases. The public reporting requirement permits
broad access to these norms. The involvement of civil society helps ensure the
government does not depart from these norms in later cases, and that modifications
are justified by the particular circumstances in each case. The continuing
obligation to engage in socioeconomic rights cases creates an incentive for the
government to incorporate these norms into social policy development more
generally, and also to consult with civil society groups when developing those
policies.
Equally important, the potential replication of engagements is largely
controlled by the political branches themselves, thus enhancing the democratic
legitimacy of the process. After City of Johannesburg, municipalities must develop
structured, long-term approaches to engagement and build plans for engagement
from the start of any redevelopment process. This forces municipalities to pay
consistent attention to the requirements of section 26 because they must consider
its implications from a long-term perspective in any development plan. It also
gives municipalities control over the timing and circumstances of engagement.
Going back to the Johannesburg example, if the city takes seriously the
obligations the court has described, it should develop something like an
"engagement department"--or at least a structured engagement review process-
that will consider what aspects of its redevelopment plans might require
engagement under section 26. The city can then decide whether a particular
226 See, e.g., Bilchitz, supra note 138, at 9 (arguing in the context of section 27's right
to health care that the court's approach "is guilty of failing to integrate ss 27(2) and (1): it
focuses the whole inquiry on s 27(2) without providing a role for s 27(1)").
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building or set of buildings requires redevelopment, and it can assess the potential
cost of engaging with residents in light of the result in City of Johannesburg.
Rather than responding in an ad hoc way to individual lawsuits over section 26, the
city can choose which interventions to make in light of its overall budget and
policy priorities.
2. Bad-Faith Engagements
There is, of course, always the possibility that a municipality will decide to
engage in bad faith. This could happen in one of several ways. First, the city could
simply refuse to engage. Second, it could go through the motions of engagement
without offering any serious concessions to residents and without seriously
justifying that refusal beyond simply saying it lacks the resources. A more subtle
alternative is for the city to go through the motions of engagement using facially
reasonable excuses for refusing to provide additional benefits, such as increased
demands from other sectors or legitimate-but pretextual-differences in the
situations between one set of residents and another.
Those cases likely will end up in court. The question then will be how a court
should deal with this kind of recalcitrance once it is identified. In the first two
scenarios--outright refusal or obvious bad faith-it makes sense for the court, at
least initially, to order further engagement with additional court control. Exercising
this option would create a process that tracks Sturm's deliberative model even
more directly.2 2 7 The court could find the municipality liable for violating section
26, not for the substantive reason that it failed to provide sufficient benefits, but on
the procedural ground that it failed to engage in good faith. Because of the public
reporting requirement, the court will have the benefit of a record from which it can
assess the process itself and order the parties to return to the bargaining table with
specific modifications. These could include a broad range of options, including
appointing a specific civil society group (or some other person) to act essentially as
a mediator. Or, less dramatically, the court could order more inclusive
consultations with groups that were either excluded or not sufficiently included.
The option to modify the specific process also gives the court an opportunity,
without directly interpreting section 26, to signal the parties in general terms
through informal discussions or formal statements on the record what it thinks
section 26 might require in a particular situation and in light of previous
engagements. Just as in Sturm's deliberative model, this would give the court an
additional opportunity to reinforce the public values at stake.228 The parties would
then return to the bargaining table but with a more specific, court-directed
procedure and substantive guidelines.
227 See discussion supra Part III.A.
228 Sturm, supra note 15, at 1429-30 (describing the court's role prior to negotiation
as "outling[ing] for the participants the characteristics of the process" and "inform[ing] the
participants as to the standards it will use to assess the adequacy of the proposed remedy").
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There is good reason to think that this kind of repeated engagement under
specific court pressure will work, even where a municipality initially ignores its
obligations. This is precisely what happened in City of Johannesburg: the specific
pressure the Constitutional Court exerted worked to force the city to engage more
seriously. 'In a left-handed compliment, the court deliberately "commended [the
city] for the fact that its position became more humane as the case proceeded
through the different courts, and for its ultimate reasonable response to the
engagement order., 229 Later in the judgment, the court itself highlighted the fact
that direct court pressure to engage and report back was "the deciding factor" that
moved the city to make concessions: "The deciding factor in this case in my view
was that engagement was ordered by this Court, and the parties had been asked to
report back on the process while the proceedings were pending before it."'230 But
the court went on to emphasize its preference that engagement "take place before
litigation commences unless it is not possible or reasonable to do so because of
urgency or some other compelling reason.
' 31
What happens in the most extreme cases where the process breaks down
completely, or the municipality persists in refusing to offer a reasonable program?
As an initial matter, the court has structured the engagement process to avoid this
result. In particular, the possibility for more direct court control over the renewed
engagement process just described will ensure that a complete breakdown is only
possible if the municipality takes an extremely hard line over time.
Nonetheless, when faced with repeated refusals to engage seriously (or simply
a good-faith impasse), the court may ultimately have to substantively interpret
section 26 and order the municipality to take specific action. On the one hand, this
looks like the failed result that Sturm argues forces the court to choose among the
less legitimate alternatives in the structural reform litigation context.232 But the key
229 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg 2008 (5) BCLR 475 (CC) at
para. 28 (S. Afr.). This quote echoes the court's rhetorical move in Minster of Health v.
Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (1) BCLR 1022 (CC) at para. 129 (S. Aft.), a health care
rights case. where, faced with public calls for defiance of any court order by senior
government officials, the court noted in the judgment that the government had always
complied with court orders in the past and there was no reason to expect a different result
in that case. As in Treatment Action Campaign, the court in City of Johannesburg appears
to be trying to coax the government into taking seriously its constitutional responsibilities
in the future rather than truly commending it for having done so in the past. See generally
Brian Ray, Policentrism, Political Mobilization and the Promise of Socioeconomic Rights,
45 STAN. J. INT. LAW 151 (2008) (arguing that the court's general approach in
socioeconomic rights cases is targeted at accustoming the political branches to take
seriously its obligations under these rights).
230 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg 2008 (5) BCLR 475 (CC) at
para. 30 (S. Afr.).
231 Id.
232 Sturm, supra note 15, at 1439. Sturm contemplates the possibility of breakdown
of the deliberative model and notes that "[a]lthough a court-imposed remedy may
undermine norms of remedial legitimacy, the court's adoption of this role derives support
from the parties' failure to reach agreement' Id.
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characteristics of engagement-its extended nature, the public reporting
requirement, and the political control it creates-leave the court in a much better
position to direct specific policy changes for several reasons.
First, the court now has a substantial record of proposals and counter-
proposals, including detailed justifications by the municipality. This enhances the
informational base from which it is making the substantive interpretation, thereby
233reducing the institutional competence concerns. In addition, once this process
has developed over time, the court also will have the benefit of records of other
engagements and can -consider the similarities and differences of this particular
situation.234
Second, as discussed earlier, the city will have decided in advance to engage
with this particular set of residents. Presumably, this choice will have taken into
account the larger context of the city's other responsibilities and priorities, and
therefore ordering expenditures will not be as potentially disruptive as it would if
the case were brought directly by residents. In other words, the political control
that engagement creates should give the court more flexibility to order some
substantive benefit where warranted, because it was a political decision to target
these groups. For the same reason, any court-ordered relief to a specific set of
residents will avoid the queue-jumping problem that the court has been concerned
with-and has used as a reason to avoid ordering individual relief in other cases. 235
In this way, engagement opens the door to making section 26 individually
233 See id. (noting that, in the case of a court-imposed remedy following deliberation,
"[t]he court's remedial decision ... will be informed by the data, diversity of perspective,
and reasoning produced by the deliberations").
234 These kinds of failed engagements also will give the court the opportunity to
develop broad substantive guidelines for these rights to guide future engagements. Sandra
Liebenberg ha*s argued that the Constitutional Court's reasonableness review could evolve
to incorporate more substantive interpretation without abandoning the context-sensitivity
and flexibility that are its key advantages. See Liebenberg, supra note 153, at 325, 328. The
engagement remedy would permit periodic interventions of the kind Liebenberg advocates
while still putting the emphasis on the development of standards through the political
process. Engagement gives the court the opportunity to review those standards over time
and, where it finds policy choices either sufficient or deficient, to articulate the
constitutional values that either support the chosen policy or require change. In this way,
the court retains the public value-creation role the Fiss argues it must play, Fiss, Foreword,
supra note 5, at 29, while still relying on civil society and the political branches to come up
with the policies to enforce those values.
235 See, e.g., Gov't of the Republic of S. Aft. v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169
(CC) at para. 92 (S. Afr.) ("This judgment must not be understood as approving any
practice of land invasion for the purpose of coercing a state structure into providing
housing on a preferential basis to those who participate in any exercise of this kind. Land
invasion is inimical to the systematic provision of adequate housing on a planned basis.");
Modder E. Squatters v. Modderklip Boerdery 2004 (8) BCLR 821 (SCA) at para. 23 (S.
Afr.) (discussing the "queue-jumping" problem identified in Grootboom).
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enforceable, but only after the political process, not the court, has determined that
some benefits should be given to a particular group.
2 36
D. Establishing and Extending Engagement
The success of engagement as a hybrid remedy for implementing
socioeconomic rights depends on the willingness of the court and municipalities to
apply it consistently over time and across different cases. Consistent application of
engagement combined with refinement of the procedure is necessary for several
reasons. First, as this Article argues, a critical mass of successful engagements is
required to establish the precedents that create the potential for norm development
outside of court decisions. Second, success of the process depends to a large
degree on the development of structured mechanisms for engagement by
government, civil society groups, and citizens. These mechanisms will develop
only if the court remains committed to ordering engagement.
There are early indications that the Constitutional Court will continue to use
engagement as a remedy' and also that it might extend it beyond eviction cases,
even to rights other than housing. A few cases provide encouraging evidence that
the court is willing to press for development of the remedy along the lines just
described, and thus establish it as an important enforcement mechanism. But the
prospect of extension also raises questions over the precise mechanisms necessary
to make engagement effective and also the limitations of the remedy.
1. Engagement in Eviction Cases
The first case, Residents of Joe Slovo Community Western Cape v Thubelisha
Homes, which the Constitutional Court decided2 37 as this Article goes to press,
looks much like City of Johannesburg. Joe Slovo involved attempts by the City of
Cape Town to evict and relocate thousands of residents of an informal community
north of Cape Town along the N2 Highway, the major north-south corridor leading
into Cape Town.238 The city targeted the residents for eviction and relocation as
part of a broad redevelopment plan involving development of new housing to
replace the existing informal settlements. 239 Large numbers of residents protested
the plan by demonstrating in and around the community and by opposing the plan
in court.240
236 See generally Brian Ray, Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg:
Enforcing the Right to Adequate Housing through 'Engagement,' 8 HUM. RTS. L. REv. 703,
707-12 (2008) (discussing the political control created by the engagement remedy).
237 Residents of Joe Slovo Cmty. W. Cape v Thubelisha Homes CCT 22/08, [2009]
ZACC 16 (S. Afr.), available at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/
13625.PDF.
238 Id. at para. 25.
239 Id. at paras. 25-26.
240 Id. at para. 34.
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The high court issued a decision permitting the relocations to proceed and
denying the residents relief shortly after the Constitutional Court issued its opinion
in City of Johannesburg.24' The judge made passing reference to the engagement
requirement and, in a parenthetical aside, found that the numerous meetings the
City Council held with residents, "along with multiple averments in the court
papers of meetings and/or consultations that were held with the residents of Joe
Slovo indicate[d] that there was a sufficient amount of engagements... regarding
this matter.,
242
The residents appealed directly to the Constitutional Court, which, in a
somewhat surprising move, accepted the direct application rather than requiring
the residents to first go through the Supreme Court of Appeal.243 Several of the
same groups that were active in organizing the residents in City of Johannesburg
submitted amicus curiae briefs to the Constitutional Court, arguing specifically that
the City of Cape Town failed to adequately engage with the residents.244 The court
granted those groups permission to present this issue at oral argument.245 During
the hearing, Deputy Chief Justice Dikgang Moseneke, in a move reminiscent of
City of Johannesburg's interim order, suggested the amici were correct by
"interven[ing] to suggest that the parties talk to each other and advise the court on
a 'just and equitable' solution.,
246
That attempt to use engagement in a similar fashion as the court had done in
City of Johannesburg-to resolve the substantive issues without direct court
involvement-failed. The court issued its decision on June 10, 2009.247 The
decision consists of five different decisions and spans 221 pages. All five opinions
agree that neither section 26 nor the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and
Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 ("PIE Act") protects the residents
from eviction.248 And all five also concur in the final order that directs how the
evictions are to take place. 249 Early reaction has been generally critical of the
court's refusal to find in favor of the residents. Sandra Liebenberg describes the
241 Thubelisha Homes v Various Occupants Case No. 13189/07, at para. 85 (S. Afr.),
available at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/12328.PDF.
242 Id. at para. 24.
243 See Pearlie Joubert, 'It's Our Duty Not to Be Silent,' MAIL & GUARDIAN ONLINE,
Aug. 24, 2008, http://www.mg.co.za/article/2008-08-24-its-our-duty-not-to-be-silent ("In a
surprise move, the Constitutional Court gave the community permission to challenge the
ruling and approach it without going through the Supreme Court of Appeal.").
44 See id. (noting that "[t]he community law centre of the University of the Western
Cape and the Centre on Housing Rights for Evictions were admitted as friends of the court,
in support of the resident's [sic] right to be properly consulted before being evicted").
245 See Further Directions by the Chief Justice 15 August 2008, available at
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/12788.PDF.
246 Joubert, supra note 243, at 252.
247 Residents of Joe Slovo Cmty. W. Cape v Thubelisha Homes CCT 22/08, [2009]
ZACC 16 (S. Afr.), available at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/
13625.PDF.
248 Id. at para. 4.
249 Id. at para. 5.
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result as "the largest judicially sanctioned eviction of a community in South
Africa's post-apartheid period."25 Pierre de Vos, while acknowledging that "the
judgment shows a genuine concern for the plight of the Joe Slovo residents,"
criticizes the substantive holdings as failing to expect "the state to act in an honest
manner and to cater also for the most vulnerable and poor members of a well-
established community whose area is to be upgraded." '251
It is beyond the scope of this article to deal with the full implications of the
court's latest decision, but several preliminary observations are possible. First, it is
evident that the court is committed to using engagement. While it was unsuccessful
in convincing the parties to engage before judgment, the court incorporated
engagement into the order itself. The unanimous order requires the parties to
"engage meaningfully with each other" on the date for relocation of the residents,
the timetable for that relocation and "any other relevant matter., 252 On the one
hand, this confirms that the court meant what it said in City of Johannesburg: that
engagement truly is a constitutional requirement.253
More important, the court has begun to establish more specific guidelines in
this case that will begin the broader project of defining the engagement procedure
and developing specific precedents that might be applied in future eviction cases.
Three points are of particular note. First, the court's use of engagement as part of a
remedial order after a substantive judgment is notable in itself as an extension of
engagement to a new procedural situation. Pierre de Vos observes that this,
combined with the court's retention of supervisory jurisdiction in the case, may in
fact be the court's way of forcing the government to engage with the residents over
a revised plan and could be a backdoor mechanism for creating the pre-move
engagement that never occurred.254
Second, in the engagement order, the court assumed much more control over
the negotiation agenda than it did in City of Johannesburg or in the Mamba
decision discussed below. Among other things, the court ordered the parties to
determine "[t]he exact time, manner and conditions" of each relocation and also
"the precise temporary residential accommodation" for each resident.255 This is the
kind of ratcheting up of court control that takes advantage of the engagement's
iterative potential and can help make the remedy more effective over time.
Finally, the court has retained supervisory jurisdiction and ordered the parties
to report back on the results of engagement on each issue.256 Like the more specific
agenda, this also represents a potentially important innovation in the engagement
250 Sandra J. Liebenberg, Unpublished Op-Ed., Opinion Piece on Joe Slovo Judgment
of Constitutional Court (file on copy with the Utah Law Review).
251 Pierre de Vos, Joe Slovo Case: The Good, the Bad and the (Mostly) Unstated,
http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/?p= 1122 (June 14, 2009).
252 Joe Slovo CCT 22/08, at para. 7.
253 See Occupiers of S1 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg 2008 (5) BCLR 475
(CC) at para. 15-16 (S. Afr.).
254 See de Vos, supra note 25 1.
255 Joe Slovo CCT 22/08 at para. 7.
256 Id.
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process by demonstrating to lower courts the possibilities for enhancing court
control while still giving parties the power to determine the substantive result.
Despite these procedural innovations, the ultimate result in Joe Slovo, like the
Mamba decision discussed next, illustrates that engagement has real limits. It also
highlights the risk in relying exclusively on this kind of indirect remedy without
ever developing the substantive requirements of section 26 directly. Mark Tushnet
(citing Cass Sunstein's discussion of constitutional development in post-Soviet
countries) argues that "[c]oupling strong rights with weak remedies, particularly
when those remedies are rarely deployed ...may be a formula for producing
cynicism about the constitution., 257 Both City of Johannesburg and Joe Slovo can
be viewed as important opportunities for the court to develop the relatively modest
enforcement of section 26 that it began in Grootboom into something more
substantial. The success of engagement in City of Johannesburg deflected criticism
about the court's refusal to deal with the substance of section 26. But the critical
reaction to the court's approval of the evictions in Joe Slovo shows that the court
must occasionally back up remedies such as engagement with more direct
enforcement for those remedies to remain effective.
2. The Limits of Engagement
The second case, Mamba v Minister of Social Development, provides an
example of the Constitutional Court extending engagement to a new context,
specifically closure of refugee camps by the Gauteng government.258 The court's
actions in the case provide additional evidence of its commitment to this remedy
and also illustrate a creative extension of engagement along the lines I have
suggested. But the final result--complete refusal by the provincial government to
meaningfully engage-demonstrates the limits of the remedy.
The wave of violent xenophobic protests that began in Johannesburg and
extended to Durban and Cape Town in May 2008 displaced tens of thousands of
people in South Africa.259 The Gauteng provincial government formally declared a
state of emergency and used disaster relief funds to establish several temporary
camps to provide security and shelter for victims of the violence.260 A range of
national and international organizations provided logistical and financial support to
the relief effort, and they began working with Gauteng and other provincial and
local governments on medium- and long-term solutions for the camp residents.261
257 See TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 252.
258 Mamba v Minister of Soc. Dev. CCT 65/08 (S. Aft.), available at
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/12830.PDF.







These efforts included repatriation of foreign nationals, asylum in another country,
and reintegration in South Africa.262
The Gauteng government initially set a deadline of July 31, 2008, for closure
of the temporary camps, later extending that deadline to August 15, 2008 .263 The
Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa (CoRMSA), an umbrella
organization that includes several of the organizations active in the relief efforts,
pressed the government to delay the closures until it developed and published a
reintegration plan.264 When the government ignored their request and publicly
announced plans to move forward with the closures, CoRMSA and the Wits Law
Clinic-housed at the University of Witwatersrand-sued in the Pretoria High
Court seeking an injunction to prevent the closures and to require the government
to develop and "communicate" a "comprehensive reintegration strategy that
adequately protects the rights of all.,
265
On August 12, 2008, the High Court rejected the refugees' arguments in a
two-page order, finding that the government had not violated any rights and had no
obligation to continue to provide accommodation.266 Two days later, the refugees
sought direct access to the Constitutional Court, even though the court was in
recess.267 Despite the recess, the court held an emergency, hearing on the
application the following Monday, August 18, and issued an interim order on
August 21.
The order temporarily prohibited complete closure of the camps, subject to
certain limitations, including the right to consolidate shelters and to deport illegal
immigrants. But it also required, in language nearly identical to the City of
Johannesburg engagement order, that the parties,
engage with each other meaningfully and with all other stakeholders as
soon as it is possible for them to do so in order to resolve the differences
and difficulties aired in the application in the light of the values of the
262 Press Release, CoRMSA, CoRMSA Calls on the Presidency to Take the Lead in
Combating Xenophobia in South Africa (May 13, 2008), available at
http://www.cornsa.org.za/press/press-statements.
263 See Press Release, CoRMSA, CoRMSA Calls for Government to Publish
Reintegration Plan for Victims of Xenophobic Violence (Aug. 1, 2008), available at
http://www.cormsa.org.za/press/press-statements; Press Release, CoRMSA, Wits Law
Clinic and CoRMSA Launch Legal Action Against Government to Ensure Sustainable
Reintegration Process (Aug. 4, 2008), available at http://www.cormsa.org.za/press/press-
statements.
264 Press Release, CoRMSA, CoRMSA Calls, supra note 263.
265 Press Release, CoRMSA, Wits Law, supra note 263.
266 Mamba v Minister of Soc. Dev. No. 36573/08-rm, at 2 (S. Afr.), available at
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/12791 .PDF.
267 No Decision on Refugees' Application, IOL ONLINE, Aug. 14, 2008,
http://www.iol.co.za (enter title of article in the article search box).
[No. 3
EXTENDING THE SHADOW OF THE LAW
Constitution, the constitutional and statutory obligations of the
respondents and the rights and duties of the residents of the shelters.268
Paragraph 5 of the order specified that the engagement should include not
only the refugees but also the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
the Jesuit Refugee Services (groups active in supporting the camps), and "[o]ther
role players., 269 The order also required the refugees, the Gauteng government and
the City of Johannesburg to report the results of the engagement by September 12
and set a hearing on the engagement for September 16.270
In spite of pressure from the National Parliament and facilitation offers by the
South African Human Rights Commission,27' the Gauteng government adopted a
narrow reading of the order and refused to negotiate a reintegration plan with
CoRMSA and others. Instead, the provincial government read the August 21 order
as requiring merely that it keep the refugees and the groups listed in the order
apprised of its continued plans for closing the camps.272
After the September 16 hearing, the Constitutional Court postponed a hearing
on the full application until November, but issued another interim order requiring
the government to maintain the camps and ordering continued engagement under
the guidelines of the August 21 order.273 CoRMSA hailed the court's decision as an
"opportunity for government, together with civil society and the broader
humanitarian assistance community" to address the reintegration problem.274
This optimism proved unwarranted. The Gauteng government persisted in its
narrow view of the court's orders and began closing the camps without consulting
268 Mamba v Minister of Soc. Dev. CCT 65/08, at para. 1 (S. Afr.), available at
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/12830.PDF.
269 Id. at para. 5(a)(i)-(v).
270 Id. at paras. 3, 9.
271 See Parliament Wants Camps Open, IOL ONLINE, Aug. 13, 2008,
http://www.iol.co.za (enter title of article in the article search box); Mamba, Applicants'
Sept. 2008 Supplementary Affidavit (The Gauteng government "has also been unwilling to
become involved in any of the other attempts, including those of Parliament and the South
African Human Rights Commission, to facilitate dialogue on the issues contemplated in the
court order.").
272 Mamba, Applicants' Sept. 2008 Supplementary Affidavit at para. 10 ("The mode
of engagement consists of informing the applicants and other stakeholders of what the
[local government] and provincial government are entitled to do in terms of the court order
as the government authority responsible for the management of the disaster declared in the
wake of the xenophobic violence.").
273 Mamba v Minister of Soc. Dev., CCT 65/08, Order Dated Sept. 16, 2008, at para.
3 (S. Aft.) (unpublished order copy on file with the author).
274 Press Release, CoRMSA, Postponement of Constitutional Court Case Presents




on a reintegration plan.275 On October 16, recognizing that the case was effectively
moot, CoRMSA withdrew the application and dismissed the case.276
What does the failed engagement in Mamba suggest for the prospects of this
remedy more generally? As an initial matter, it highlights the political nature of
engagement and its dependence on the willingness of the political branches to take
the process seriously. Put differently, the flexibility and enhanced legitimacy
offered by engagement's hybridity carries with it the cost of losing the direct court
control and specificity of traditional remedies.
The history of more direct court interventions in the United States suggests
that this cost may not be as great in practice as it appears in theory, because
governments often find ways to resist even very specific court orders. But the
ambiguity inherent in engagement arguably provides more opportunity for
resistance, and potentially allows it to come at a lesser political cost. The Gauteng
government's narrow reading of what engagement required exemplifies this
weakness.
By the same token, this "failed" engagement suggests that the remedy must be
developed in ways that both encourage the political branches to take it seriously,
and also permit stronger court intervention where appropriate. One potentially
critical difference between City of Johannesburg and Mamba was the High Court's
initial injunction in City of Johannesburg, which forced the city to stop its eviction
program. It was much easier for the Constitutional Court to order the parties to
negotiate without the threat of imminent eviction, and the city had greater
incentive to take the negotiations seriously, having already stopped the program.
By contrast, the High Court in Mamba permitted the government to proceed with
the closures,2 77 and, although the Constitutional Court's August 21 order arguably
required the government to maintain the camps, it was sufficiently qualified that
the government could adopt the narrow reading that it did, thus eliminating any
incentive to engage meaningfully.
These disparate results suggest two things. First, when ordering engagement
in the context of an ongoing dispute, courts-at least in the short term-should be
more willing to enjoin the challenged activity. Second, if, in the face of failed
engagements, courts demonstrate a willingness to order substantive remedies, over
275 See South African Press Association, Refugees Turfed out of Their Tents, IOL
ONLINE, October 7, 2008, http://www.int.iol.co.za (enter the title of the article in the article
search box). In a sadly ironic parallel, the government used the same "red ant" security
groups to evict the refugees as the City of Johannesburg had used in the City of
Johannesburg evictions. Id. ("'They didn't tell us they [the red ants] were going to do it,'
said Jane Senga, originally from Angola.").
276 Press Release, CoRMSA, Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa
Withdraws Constitutional Court Case; Calls for a Thorough Review of Disaster
Management Mechanisms (October 16, 2008), available at http://www.cormsa.org.za/
press/press-statements.
277 Mamba v Minister of Soc. Dev. No. 36573/08-rm, at 2 (S. Aft.), available at
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/12791 .PDF.
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time that will create an additional incentive for the government to engage seriously
or risk losing the political control the remedy creates.
More broadly, the Mamba result reinforces the need to develop engagement
as a structured, long-term process, rather than relying on it solely as an ad hoc
remedy during an ongoing case. As the court emphasized in City of Johannesburg,
engagement will work best where it is built into the policy development process
from the start.278
Pushing engagement back into the policy development process raises difficult
questions, i.e., at what level and at what point in the process does it make sense to
engage? It is relatively easy to imagine extending engagement to other cases, like
Mamba or Joe Slovo. And the court's willingness to order engagement in Mamba
demonstrates that engagement is now an integral part of its enforcement arsenal.
But Mamba arguably failed because the engagement came too late and with too
little direct court involvement.
Assuming that the Mamba order- can be read together with City of
Johannesburg as requiring provincial governments to build engagement into
broader immigration and refugee policy, what would that look like? This is an
extremely complicated question to answer in the abstract with the camps now
closed and the refugees dispersed. Is the Gauteng government required now to
"engage" with the same NGO's on emergency plans for responses to potential
future crises? Must it engage with the refugees who remain in South Africa? Must
the reports of those engagements be made public? All of these questions suggest
difficult lines must be drawn for engagement to develop into an effective remedy.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to precisely describe where those lines
should be drawn. But it is apparent that engagement should be viewed not as a
single event limited to a particular point in time, but instead as a process that
should be incorporated on several levels. To use the Mamba example, the Gauteng
government should build engagement into whatever steps it takes to develop
policies both to prevent the xenophobic violence that led to the Mamba camps and
to respond to similar situations in the future. Doing so not only makes good policy
sense, but also provides the government with a record to which it can point if the
policies it ultimately adopts are challenged in the future.
This by itself suggests one (fairly weak) incentive for the government to
engage outside of a pending or threatened lawsuit: the ability to create a record to
which it can point if and when a challenge arises. But engagement should not be
limited to broad consultation in the policy development process, or else it will
become nothing more than the kind of good governance standard that the
Constitutional Court's critics argue diminishes the force of socioeconomic rights.
If similar protests occur in the future, then the government should consider specific
engagements when developing its disaster-relief plan and during the windup
process that was at issue in Mamba.
278 See Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg 2008 (5) BCLR 475
(CC) at paras. 14-15 (S. Afr.).
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There are, of course, limits to how often and to what extent individual
governments can incorporate engagement either into the policy development
process or at the implementation phase. At some point, the government can
legitimately decide that the process is complete-regardless of whether all parties
are happy with the result. As discussed above, where there is disagreement, parties
are free to seek court relief, and further engagement, if warranted, should be an
option for the courts. But it is also conceivable that the court will simply determine
that no further engagement is required and, based on the public record, that the
policy adopted by the government is a reasonable one. The precise scope of the
government's responsibility to engage will never be completely clear, but some
clarity in the form of general guidelines and precedents will develop over time. It
is less important to establish clear guidelines for when and at what points to
engage, than it is to emphasize the need for consistent engagement over time.
V. CONCLUSION
As a hybrid process that operates somewhere between pure ADR and pure
adjudication-and, indeed oscillates between those extremes-engagement offers
a novel and potentially important tool for enforcing socioeconomic rights. That
tool falls somewhat short of the call by the Constitutional Courts' critics for full-
fledged judicial interpretation and enforcement, but the same features that make
engagement something less than strong court enforcement also enhance its
legitimacy.
Michelman's description of the effects of a hypothetical "constitutionally
declared right of everyone to the enjoyment of social citizenship" illustrates this
point.279 Michelman points out that such an ambiguous right "would leave just
about every major issue of public policy still to be decided. '280 But, he argues,
such a right could still have important effects on democratic decision making:
Its maximum (but maybe not trivial) effect on democratic
decisionmaking (the courts being kept away) would be a certain pressure
on the frame of mind in which citizens and their elected representatives
would approach the sundry questions of public policy always waiting to
be decided. In Rawlsian language, the point of naming social citizenship
a constitutional right would be to give a certain inflection to political
public reason. Across a very broad swathe of public issues, such a
naming would amount to a demand that those issues be approached as
occasions for exercises ofjudgment-which choice will be conducive to
the social citizenship of everyone, on fair terms?-rather than as
invitations to press and to vote one's own naked interests and
preferences.28'
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Engagement operates in a similar, but somewhat more coercive, fashion to
force the political branches to pay consistent attention to section 26 (and possibly
other socioeconomic rights in the future) whenever they develop social policy.
Rather than removing the courts (as in Michelman's description), engagement
gives them a specific, but, at least initially, limited role that incorporates the
legitimacy norms emphasized by Fiss and Fuller while leaving substantive policy-
making largely in the political realm.

